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HOW TO LIVE WITH A TAX CODE WITH
WHICH YOU DISAGREE: DOCTRINE,
OPTIMAL TAX, COMMON SENSE, AND THE
DEBT-EQUITY DISTINCTION*
ILAN BENSHALOM**
The current financial crisis and recession demonstrate the
overwhelming social cost of high leverage. While many factors
contributed to the development of the crisis, one factor is frequently
overlooked-the tax incentive for excessive debt financing. This
Article explains how the debt-equity distinction in the tax code
provides corporations with incentives to rely on highly leveraged
finance structures. It then asserts that even though there is little
justification for the tax code to favor debt over equity investment,
this bias is deeply rooted and hard to overcome. Given the political
difficulty in eliminating the distinction, policy makers and
academics should develop a debt-equity distinction with lower
social costs. However, both doctrine and academic literature fail to
address this problem because the current legal discourse responds
to rules that were developed in the first half of the twentieth century.
In those days, the corporate tax was primarily imposed on private
and closely held corporations, there was a huge difference between
individual and corporate tax rates, financial engineering was
limited, and the vast majority of investors and corporations were
United States tax residents. None of these conditions applies today,
and, as a result, the tax rules distinguishing debt from equity
unnecessarily increase the social costs of compliance, and, more
importantly, the costs of financial distress. Remarkably, the current
rules are ineffective even in preventing tax revenue loss because they
fail to recognize the weakest link in terms of tax erosion-interest
payments made to foreign investors. These payments may escape
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United States taxation altogether because they are deductible from
the corporate tax.
This Article develops a more practical and easily administrable
distinction between debt and equity based on two easy-to-observe
and difficult-to-manipulate characteristics-voting power and
duration. This new distinction should be used to classify the
holdings of domestic investors in public corporations. Further, the
analysis of the debt-equity distinction triggers a broader theoretical
inquiry over the principles that should guide tax policy makers in
line-drawing problems. As a theoretical matter, these problems arise
where there is a need to distinguish between two transactions which
result in dramatically different tax consequences even though they
could be economically very similar.
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INTRODUCTION
"How to live in a world with which you disagree?"'
When Milan Kundera posited the question of how to live in a
world with which you disagree, he was not thinking about tax.
However, tax policy makers face this question every day when they
confront real-world line-drawing problems caused by various
inconsistencies in the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code"). When it
comes to tax, failure to adequately reconcile these inconsistencies is
very costly in terms of economic distortion, compliance cost, and tax
revenue.
Some of these inconsistencies have haunted the Code for so long
that they seem almost beyond reform, despite the high costs
associated with them. These inconsistencies result from the very
different tax treatment that tax legislation assigns to transactions that
are to some extent substitutable. To illustrate the significant harms
caused by this general problem of inconsistent tax treatment, this
Article evaluates one of the most ancient and pernicious problems in
the Code-the debt-equity distinction. This distinction lies at the
heart of three important debates in contemporary tax-policy
literature: the income tax treatment of financial instruments,2 the
1. MILAN KUNDERA, IMMORTALITY 257 (Peter Kussi trans., Grove Weidenfeld
1991) (1990).
2. The inherent deficiency of the income tax regime and the excessive use of
innovative financial instruments for tax avoidance purposes seem to compel
considerations of fundamental reforms in the income tax treatment of financial
instruments. See generally David M. Schizer, Balance in the Taxation of Derivative
Securities: An Agenda for Reform, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1886 (2004) (providing an
argument and a proposal for such a fundamental reform). The rapid flow of financial
innovation highlights the vulnerability of many income tax conventions because it allows
for an infinite number of different intangible instruments, which do not have a finite useful
life or a fixed location and can be tailored to perform different functions to different
parties. The income tax system, on the other hand, "works by describing a finite number of
idealized transactions and attaching to each a set of operative rules" and assumes that
once a financial product is classified, it "fill[s] the same financial role for all taxpayers in
all circumstances." Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial
Innovation's Newest Challenge to the Tax System, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1319, 1320, 1354 (1991).
The tension between the economic reality in financial markets and the tax rules classifying
instruments is evident: most innovative financial instruments are unlikely to perfectly fit
any of these idealized transactions, rendering their appropriate tax treatment unclear. Jeff
Strnad, Taxing New Financial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. L. REV. 569,
570 (1994). This vagueness, along with the mobility, fungibility, and contractual flexibility
of financial assets, allows sophisticated tax planners to take advantageous positions with
regard to issues of timing-realization, ownership, character (as income or capital gains),
and with respect to whether the income should be considered as derived from business
activities in the United States. See Jeffrey M. Col6n, Financial Products and Source Basis
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need for corporate shareholder income tax integration,3 and the
taxation of income derived from capital.4 Moreover, the murkiness of
Taxation: U.S. International Tax Policy at the Crossroads, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 789-
807 (elaborating on how financial instruments can defeat the various source rules); Mark
P. Gergen & Paula Schmitz, The Influence of Tax Law on Securities Innovation in the
United States: 1981-1997, 52 TAX L. REV. 119, 120 (1997); Yoram Keinan, United States
Federal Taxation of Derivatives: One Way or Many?, 61 TAX LAW. 81, 84 (2007): Michael
S. Knoll, Financial Innovation, Tax Arbitrage, and Retrospective Taxation: The Problem
with Passive Government Lending, 52 TAX L. REV. 199, 200 (1997); Katherine Pratt, The
Debt-Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1057, 1058-93
(2000) (discussing how financial contract innovation illustrates the costs associated with
the debt-equity distinction); Daniel Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital
Income, 50 TAX L. REV. 643, 652-53 (1995) (explaining how financial derivatives allow
taxpayers to overcome risk-based rules to determine ownership by allowing taxpayers to
create synthetic instruments with similar cash flows to other instruments); Alvin C.
Warren, Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 HARV. L. REV. 460,
492 (1993) (stressing that the existing concept of realization does not seem adequate to
deal with innovative financial contracts). See generally Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in
Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money," 95 YALE L.J. 506, 519 (1986) (explaining the
concept of deferral and the time value of money). Even though these problems are not
unique to financial instruments, the current income tax system pushes them to their very
extreme because of its inconsistency and incomprehensiveness. See Shaviro, supra, at 652.
As a result, the income tax treatment of financial instruments is price-distortive,
inequitable, loaded with arbitrage opportunities, and a source for disproportional
compliance and administrative costs. See Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to Tax Financial
Income in a Global Economy: Emerging to an Allocation Phase, 28 VA. TAX REV. 165,
193-95 (2008); see also Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation of Equity Derivatives: A Partial
Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REV. 571, 573-79 (1995) ("[T]he lack of universality and
consistency in the tax treatment of equity derivatives results in inefficiencies and
inequities.").
3. In essence, the debt-equity frictions result directly from the corporate income tax
regime, in which corporations are taxed separately from their shareholders and where
interest payments are deductible while dividends are not. David A. Weisbach, A Partial
Mark-to-Market Tax System, 53 TAX L. REV. 95, 115 (1999). Accordingly, the debt-equity
distinction is interesting because it predated modern financial theory. See Steven A. Bank,
Corporate Managers, Agency Costs, and the Rise of Double Taxation, 44 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 167, 170 (2002) (describing the origins of the double tax on corporations). As such,
the debt-equity distinction touches on the broader policy question of whether or not a
separate corporate income tax is justified at all. The opinions on this matter vary
considerably. While most tax scholars regard the separate corporate income tax as an
utterly inequitable and inefficient tax, others find some justification for preserving it in
one form or the other. For criticism of the corporate tax, see Jennifer Arlen & Deborah
M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325, 328-31 (1995)
(reviewing the strong academic and policy consensus over the inequitable nature of the
corporate tax); Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren Jr., Integration of Corporate and
Individual Income Taxes: An Introduction to the Issues, in INTEGRATION OF THE U.S.
CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT AND
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE REPORTS 3, 25-26 (Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren Jr.
eds., 1998). For arguments favoring some form of separate corporate tax, see Steven A.
Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the Corporate Income Tax, 94 GEO. L.J. 889, 946-47
(2006) (offering moderate support for the corporate tax as a way to take into account
capital lock up); Terrence R. Chorvat, Apologia for the Double Taxation of Corporate
Income, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 242-43 (2003) (explaining why, in a pure income
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the debt-equity distinction and the different tax treatment of debt
and equity have a huge effect on our economy because they
incentivize firms to leverage their financial structure by financing
their activities with debt rather than equity investments. As this
Article explains, corporate managers and shareholders have a tax
incentive to finance corporate activities through instruments classified
as debt for tax purposes so that the payments made according to them
are deductible.' This leveraged financial structure allows corporations
to show shareholders higher after-tax profits, which supports claims
for higher manager compensation. It also increases corporations'
bankruptcy risk as well as other costs of financial distress and makes
corporations dependent upon an ongoing flow of credit to
continuously refinance their activities.
The current distinction between debt and equity relies on vague
rules. Over time, tax lawyers have learned to exploit its vulnerabilities
in order to help corporate taxpayers increase their interest deductions
by eroding the definition of equity in favor of debt.6 Tax planners'
ability to avoid equity characterization obviously resulted in a
revenue loss to the Treasury. It also allowed equity investors to shift
tax, a higher tax rate on the return for corporate equity would actually encourage
investment in those relatively risky assets); Herwig J. Schlunk, I Come Not to Praise the
Corporate Income Tax, But to Save It, 56 TAX L. REV. 329, 335-62 (2003) (providing a
different justification for a much broader corporate tax base); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Corporations, Society and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax 29-46 (Mich. Law &
Econ. Research, Paper No. 04-006, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=516202
(arguing for the retention of the corporate tax).
4. The debt-equity distinction also reflects the broader question of whether the
income tax is justified at all, or whether it should be replaced with an alternative
consumption tax. In this context, commentators often use problems such as the debt-
equity distinction as an example for how difficult it is to tax income generated from
capital. See William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income
Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1118-19 (1974) (arguing that the current income tax has not
been effective in terms of taxing wealth or wealth accumulation and that it would be
difficult to make it so, suggesting instead that if wealth should be taxed, wealth transfer
taxes are a more appropriate device); Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a
Progressive Consumption Tax, 103 TAX NoTES 91, 95-106 (2004) (surveying the literature
justifying the shift to a consumption tax); Shaviro, supra note 2, at 647-48, 708 (pointing
out the difficulty of relying on risk-based rules-such as the rules distinguishing between
debt and equity-and suggesting that one alternative is to stop taxing income from
capital). See generally HENRY J. AARON ET AL., TAXING CAPITAL INCOME (Henry J.
Aaron et al. eds., 2007) (providing a thorough collection of articles on the topic).
5. See discussion infra Part I.A.
6. See infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text (discussing the creation and use of
Monthly Income Preferred Stocks ("MIPS")).
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into more debt-like investment instruments and corporations to rely
on a more highly leveraged financial structure.7
There is no better time to discuss the long-term harmful effects
of this leverage incentive than in the midst of the current financial
crisis. In times of financial crisis, when credit markets are believed to
be inefficient and overly risk-averse, this high leverage rate reduces
managers' flexibility, requiring them to either raise capital at very
high finance costs or to cut back on their business activities. The
difference in tax treatment of debt and equity gave financial
intermediaries, such as investment banks and mortgage providers,
incentives to over-leverage their activities, which in turn increased
their chances of bankruptcy and failure.8 It also aggravated the
recessionary impact of the financial meltdown on the real economy
because firms operating with low equity cushions are very dependent
on their ongoing access to credit to run their basic operations. While
the difference in tax treatment of debt and equity is probably not the
primary reason for the current financial crisis, its existence
substantially contributed to the development of the crisis and
worsened its outcomes. As a result, we face one of the worst
recessions in modern history, which may have devastating effects on
human welfare and political stability worldwide.
The debt-equity distinction problem is unique because of the
huge social costs it imposes, which is why this Article seeks to analyze
and help resolve it. However, as a theoretical matter, it is part of a
broader problem of line-drawing where tax professionals are required
to distinguish between similar transactions and to classify them
according to different statutory categories.' These line-drawing
problems are an inherent part of the Code. Dealing with them
becomes more difficult as taxpayers take advantage of the Code's
7. It also allowed the countereffect of debt investors shifting to more equity-like
investments without obtaining equity characterization. For a more elaborated discussion
on this point, see infra note 61 and accompanying text.
8. See discussion infra Part I.A.
9. Such examples include the distinction between an employee and an independent
contractor, between capital assets and assets the sale of which gives rise to ordinary
income, and between deductible and capitalized expenses. Another example, which has
triggered a considerable amount of scholarly writing, is the distinction among
nonrecognition transactions. See Joshua D. Blank, Confronting Continuity: A Tradition of
Fiction in Corporate Reorganizations, 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 19-44 (pointing to the
artificiality of the continuity of interest doctrine developed by courts to distinguish
genuine tax-free corporate reorganizations from taxable transactions); Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don't Need Another Hero, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 397, 411
(1987) (discussing the lack of concrete purpose of in-kind property exchange transactions).
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increasing complexity to structure tax avoidance transactions.'1 To
date, both legal doctrine and academic scholarship have provided
only partially satisfying solutions to this vexing line-drawing
problem."
It is unreasonable to wait for a fundamental tax reform to
eradicate these inconsistencies. If history is any indication, tax
legislation is typically the producer of frictions and inconsistencies
rather than a mechanism for eliminating them. 2 Accordingly, one
should adopt a moderately skeptical position about addressing the
debt-equity distinction or other line-drawing problems through
legislation. Therefore, devising good intermediary regulatory policy
solutions to rectify imperfect (yet politically stable) tax legislation is
an important task because it involves real problems that impact real
people and has substantial revenue and efficiency stakes that affect
our society.
To understand the tension at the core of the debt-equity
distinction, one has to adopt a broader framework for analyzing the
line-drawing problems within the Code. Creating sustainable
regulatory solutions requires three types of analyses. First, we must
understand why the rules we have were originally enacted. Second,
we must judge how the economic reality in which these rules operate
has changed over the course of time. Finally, and most importantly, it
is not enough to say that specific immutable rules require arbitrary
line-drawing. After determining why the current rules do not work, it
is important to see what objectives they can and should achieve.
The debt-equity distinction is a real-world problem that
academics simply cannot ignore. However, this Article asserts that
analysis of the debt-equity distinction also offers important insights
for the broader line-drawing problem underlying the Code. The
distinction is a familiar line-drawing problem and several tax scholars
have adopted a second-best approach for addressing it. 3 Apart from
10. These are often referred to as tax arbitrage transactions, which allow taxpayers to
attain certain economic positions while avoiding unfavorable tax treatment associated with
those positions.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.
12. See generally Michael J. Graetz, Tax Reform Unraveling, 21 J. ECON. PERsP. 69
(2007), available at http://www.atypon-link.com/AEAP/doi/abs/10.1257/jep.21.1.69
(discussing generally how the legislative process adds to tax law complexity).
13. See Pratt, supra note 2, at 1115, 1117-18; discussion of Weisbach articles infra Part
IV.B; see also Anthony P. Polito, A Modest Proposal Regarding Debt-Like Preferred
Stock, 20 VA. TAX REV. 291, 295 (2000) (exploring the applicability of the risk-and-return
framework to preferred stock to exclude it from being characterized as equity for
corporate tax purposes).
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its huge social impact and its relation to other fundamental tax
controversies, two attributes make the debt-equity distinction an
ideal line-drawing case study. First, it is relatively well known and not
too technically complicated. This Article focuses on one key
difference between the tax treatment of debt and equity
instruments-that interest payments are deductible from the
corporate income tax and dividends are not. 4 Hence, this policy
inquiry requires only a very basic framework and can be made
without first delving into long technical explanations about tax rules
(not suited for the faint-hearted). The debt-equity distinction thus
provides a rare opportunity to examine why current academic and
doctrinal attempts to approach real-world tax problems often fall
short.
Second, the debt-equity distinction is an ideal line-drawing case
study because it seems to be politically immutable. Reforms that
would have affected the tax treatment of debt and equity have been
frequently proposed over the years. 5 However, all historic attempts
to overcome this problem have failed, 6 and most of the (politically
plausible) tax-reform proposals intend to leave the debt-equity
distinction in place.17
Regardless of one's opinion on these reform proposals, a few
issues are hardly in dispute. First, despite its old age, this century-long
tax controversy of how to distinguish debt from equity is neither close
to being solved nor likely to be reformed.18 Second, the stakes of the
debt-equity line-drawing problem are so high that they should not be
14. See I.R.C. §§ 163,311(a) (2006).
15. Pratt, supra note 2, at 1117-58 (providing a comprehensive explanation of the
different reform proposals); see also Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 1363-68 (suggesting a
radical reform that taxes most investment on an accrual basis of expected return with
modifications upon realization); Knoll, supra note 2, at 219-20 (summarizing some of the
deficiencies of the different approaches dealing with the tax arbitrage problem in relation
to financial instruments); Reed Shuldiner, A General Approach to the Taxation of
Financial Instruments, 71 TEx. L. REV. 243, 246 (1992) (developing a general framework
for the timing of financial instruments under a realization-based income tax); Strnad,
supra note 2, at 569-72 (summarizing the principles of an ideal system); Warren, supra
note 2, at 473-77 (discussing several workable tax policy responses to the fixed versus
contingent returns distinction).
16. See generally Graetz & Warren, supra note 3 (describing both the Treasury and
American Law Institute ("ALl") proposals-neither of which were ever executed).
17. See generally Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (including a change
in the tax rate on dividend income, but not eliminating the debt-equity distinction).
18. See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law,
84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1637-39 (1999) (discussing failed attempts to distinguish
between debt and equity and the lack of congressional guidance on the distinction).
1224 [Vol. 88
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ignored any longer. 9 Third, the lack of a coherent debt-equity
distinction poses an immediate threat to the viability of the corporate
tax base as a fiscal instrument' ° and distorts investment decisions.2 1 It
is also one of the most frequently litigated tax controversies, which
generates huge administrative, compliance, and uncertainty costs.
22
Interestingly, the rules distinguishing debt from equity are
appropriate for dealing with the line-drawing problems they were
intended to address. However, they were generated at a time when
many of the corporations subject to the corporate tax were closely
held private family corporations, only a limited number of financial
instruments were offered in financial markets, there was a sharp
difference between the individual and corporate tax rates, and almost
all corporate and individual taxpayers affected by the rules were
United States residents.23 To be sure, even though the rules
distinguishing debt-equity instruments may have functioned
reasonably well in the first half of the twentieth century, the
distinction itself probably made little sense even then. Given a blank
sheet on which to rewrite the corporate tax law, we probably would
not include it. However, the tax rules that were generated to draw the
line between debt and equity were suitable to deal with the problems
that emerged out of the business reality in which they were written-
problems of shareholders lending money to their controlled
corporations to avoid paying both the corporate tax and the high
individual income taxes on dividend payments. 24
Financial markets have developed and proliferated dramatically
since then. Today, firms employ modern financial engineering to issue
financial instruments that do not fit into the categories determined a
century ago.' The corporate tax effectively has become a tax on the
19. See Mark P. Gergen, Apocalypse Not?, 50 TAX L. REV. 833, 840-41 (1995)
(accepting that the debt-equity distinction is a threat to the integrity of the corporate tax
base).
20. Id. (expressing skepticism about the extent that other financial instruments could
really be used to avoid taxes); Strnad, supra note 2, at 604 (stating that the inconsistency in
the tax treatment of debt and equity allows financial engineers to use the overlap between
those categories to designate the same transactions as equity or debt for tax purposes).
21. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text; see also Alvin C. Warren, The
Relation and Integration of the Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV.
717, 721-30 (1981) (explaining the distortions of the double tax structure in pre-1986 tax
rates).
22. Nathan R. Christensen, Comment, The Case for Reviewing Debt/Equity
Determinations for Abuse of Discretion, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2007).
23. See infra Part II.B.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See David A. Weisbach, Tax Responses to Financial Contract Innovation, 50 TAX
L. REV. 491, 494-500 (1995).
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access to public markets rather than a tax on limited liability because
most entities with limited liability are no longer subject to the
corporate tax. 6 There has also been a substantial change in the
corporate and individual income tax rates.2 7 Most importantly,
however, corporations issue instruments to a varied and dispersed
body of investors, many of whom are tax-exempt or foreigners.'
These interest payments are "efficient" from a tax planning
perspective because they reduce the corporations' tax liabilities, but
foreigners receiving these interest payments are typically subject to
only very low liabilities in the country in which they were paid.
All of the above changes are institutional phenomena unlikely to
be reversed. This means that as long as we distinguish between debt
and equity for tax purposes, we should make sure that the distinction
operates within what can reasonably be achieved within this new
reality. Put differently, given that the tax law distinguishes between
debt and equity, we should make this distinction in a way that
minimizes the social costs associated with it. This Article argues that
the current rules are inappropriate for a number of reasons. First,
they were developed primarily to deal with evidentiary difficulties of
what the "real" transactions were between controlling shareholders
and their private, closely held corporations.2 9 This is no longer an
issue because most of the instruments we are concerned with today
are issued on the public markets and, therefore, in most situations,
have very clear terms.3" Second, as long as investors are United States
residents, the revenue difference between the debt and equity
characterization in the current tax rate structure is not very
significant.31 Third, the real potential for a revenue loss arises only
when foreign investors achieve debt classification, but there are better
ways to address this problem.
26. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 93-112 and accompanying text.
28. Michael S. Knoll, The Taxation of Private Equity Carried Interests: Estimating the
Revenue Effects of Taxing Profit Interests as Ordinary Income, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
115, 130-32 (2008) (making an assessment that sixty percent of the investors in private
equity firms are foreigners or tax exempt).
29. See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
31. This is a result of changes in the tax rate structure that happened over the course
of the last twenty years. These changes include the low effective tax rate on corporations,
the historically low top marginal tax rate on individual income, and the special 15% tax
rates on dividends. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (2006). There may, however, be some other
factors that may be significant, such as the different timing rules for interest and dividend
payments and the ability to withdraw principal without tax in the context of debt
instruments.
1226 [Vol. 88
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This means that even though the debt-equity distinction is
difficult to change politically, its main objective today should not be
to distinguish "true" shareholders from creditors, so much as it should
be to reduce distortions, compliance costs, and administrative costs. I
propose to replace the current convoluted rules for determining
whether a specific hybrid instrument should be treated as debt or
equity with a rule that involves two easy-to-observe and difficult-to-
manipulate factors-duration and voting rights.
This Article's approach tries to make academic tax policy
discourse more practical and the real-world line-drawing debate more
policy oriented. As such, it offers a nuanced understanding of how
line-drawing problems should be approached. The impact of this
Article extends beyond the debt-equity distinction of the line-
drawing problem because it reminds us that tax academics should not
and cannot be insulated from real-world problems. It demonstrates
that academic work does not have to rely on abstract, over-simplified
models, nor does it have to excessively analyze complex tax law
technicalities to participate in real-world tax debates. In more
concrete terms, this Article's analysis of the debt-equity distinction
suggests that academics should at least think about how their work
can be translated into real-world changes-that is, they should
account for the fact that radical legislative tax reforms are rare and
that most short-term progress could and should be sought through
incremental regulatory changes.
The unavoidable conclusion of the debt-equity distinction
analysis is that while tax scholars cannot offer a bright-line rule for all
real-world line-drawing problems, they should try to develop a more
uniform methodology for addressing those problems. Put differently,
academics who care about issues of efficiency and redistribution
cannot live in a world in which "proper" tax-law academic work deals
primarily with abstract issues, and real-world tax practice is anything
but theoretical. Accordingly, this Article makes three contributions: it
offers a realistic option for reforming a costly and unresolved friction
in our tax system; it points out the limitations of what policy makers
can hope to achieve through the use of doctrinal analysis and abstract
economic models; and it shows that even though many parts of the
Code are arbitrary, one can still adopt a general policy-oriented
methodology to approach them. This approach may not resolve all
the inconsistencies and arbitrary distinctions in our tax law, but it
would allow us to endure them and "live" better with a tax law with
which we disagree.
2010] 1227
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Part I lays out and explains the stakes of the debt-equity
distinction and the doctrinal answer to it. Part II then examines how
the circumstances have changed from the time in which the law
distinguishing debt and equity was developed until today. It then
demonstrates why the doctrinal answer fails to provide a better policy
to distinguish debt and equity. Part III explains how the debt-equity
line-drawing problem should be approached. Part IV uses the debt-
equity distinction to generalize some broader principles of how
arbitrary line-drawing frictions in the tax law should be addressed. It
provides a general theoretical framework to evaluate the line-drawing
problem and explains the Article's approach in a more general
context. This Part then demonstrates why other approaches, such as
the one offered by Professor David Weisbach, are not by themselves
sufficient to help policy makers solve line-drawing problems.32 The
last Part offers some short conclusions. It emphasizes that a reduction
in the social costs of the debt-equity distinction is feasible if policy
makers adopt a fresh and sober perspective on how to best address
the matters at stake.
I. THE DEBT-EQUITY DISTINCTION
This Part seeks to familiarize the reader with the debt-equity
distinction by explaining its tax consequences and the doctrinal
approach to determining whether an instrument is debt or equity.
A. The Tax Advantage of Debt
This sub-Part explains the stakes of the debt-equity distinction
under current tax law. It illustrates that while debt and equity
instruments may be economically similar in many ways, their tax
treatment is radically different. The analysis focuses on how this
distinction operates with regard to instruments issued to the public
even though the rules governing the distinction do not categorically
distinguish between private and public corporations.
Corporations want to raise money and raise it cheaply. Investors,
on the other hand, are interested in maximizing returns while
minimizing their risk. When issuing to the public, corporations do not
distinguish between different sources of capital contributions-they
aim to invest all capital productively and promise both equity and
32. See David A. Weisbach, Thinking Outside the Little Boxes: A Response to
Professor Schlunk, 80 TEX. L. REV. 893,908 (2002).
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debt investors a return, without assigning them property rights in the
assets accumulated by the corporations.
3
The prototypes of debt and equity instruments are easy to
distinguish. Equities are instruments that have no fixed maturity date
and grant owners voting power and a right for a residual profit that is
subordinated to all other claims against the corporation. 34 Debt
instruments are funds transferred in return for a reasonable
expectation of repayment within a fairly short and well-defined
period.35 They frequently provide their holders with fixed periodical
interest payments until repaid. The expected return on equity is
usually different than on debt because the investors' returns are
contingent on many unforeseeable factors related to the success of
the firm's business strategy.3" This contingency is typically perceived
to make the equity investments riskier than investments in bonds
(which are debt instruments), and, as a result, equity investors
typically demand a higher return for their investments.
There is a wide spectrum of risk-return combinations, and many
considerations impact how issued instruments are designed and
whether they bear greater resemblance to classic debt or equity. It is
important to remember, however, that corporations and investors do
not care so much for the abstract legal classifications of their actions,
but rather they care about the price they are expected to pay, the risk
they undertake, and the nominal amount and timing of their potential
returns.
Given the above, the "functional similarity" between debt and
equity is clear-both are instruments through which corporations
raise money by offering investors a return that correlates with the risk
of their investments.37 Despite this functional similarity, most income
tax regimes treat proceeds of debt and equity instruments
differently,38 resulting in different tax consequences on both the
33. Cf David P. Hariton, Distinguishing Between Equity and Debt in the New
Financial Environment, 49 TAx L. REV. 499, 501 (1994) (noting the many possible
corporate objectives for raising capital).
34. Anthony P. Polito, Useful Fictions: Debt and Equity Classification in Corporate
Tax Law, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 761, 770-71 (1998).
35. The return for debt investment is not completely insulated from the firm's
business success. However, the firm's commitment to periodic interest payments and the
relatively short term of many debt transactions make the repayment contingent on fewer
factors.
36. RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS & FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES
OF CORPORATE FINANCE 147-49 (8th ed. 2006).
37. TIM EDGAR, THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 93 (2000).
38. Id. at 40.
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corporate and investor levels.39 Most importantly, interest payments
are generally deductible from corporate income while dividends are
not.4" For example, let us assume a corporation earns $200 of gross
income in a given year and has to pay $100 to an investor. If the
corporation pays the investor $100 in interest, it would reduce its
taxable income to $100. Accordingly, if the corporate tax rate is 35%,
it would have to pay $35 in taxes. If it pays the investor $100 in
dividend payments, it would still be required to pay the corporate tax
on $200 and would have a tax liability of $70. This is the essence of
the double tax on equity investments. Corporations are artificial
entities, so the tax is ultimately born by individuals. If part of the
corporate tax is born by investors, there is double tax because the
return of equity investors is taxed twice-once by the corporate tax
and once when the dividends are paid.4
There are two other main differences between dividends and
interest payments. First, investors pay tax on interest payments they
receive at ordinary (progressive) income rates whereas in the fiscal
years of 2003-2009, investors had to pay only (lower) capital gains
rates on the dividends they received.43 If the corporation refrains from
distributing dividends, its stock appreciation would be taxed when
sold by the investor and would be subject to a capital gains tax if held
for more than a year. Second, there is a timing difference. Dividends,
which are considered volatile and uncertain payments, are realized by
39. For a comprehensive list of those differences, see Pratt, supra note 2, at 1059-60;
Margaret A. Gibson, Comment, The Intractable Debt/Equity Problem: A New Structure
for Analyzing Shareholder Advances, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 452, 454-55 (1987); see also
Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax
Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARV. L. REV. 874, 889-92 (2003)
(explaining how financing through convertible debt reduces the tax valuation of equity-
based compensation of managers in venture capital corporations).
40. This Article deals only with "C corporations," meaning corporations that are
subject to the corporate tax under I.R.C. § 11 (2006), and not "S corporations," which in
most cases are not subject to a separate entity tax. See I.R.C. § 1363(a). Virtually all
publicly traded companies are C corporations. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
For an exception, see Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 TAx L. REV. 89, 106-07
(2008) (explaining the tax planning strategy which allowed Blackstone to issue its shares to
the public as a pass-through partnership).
41. See generally DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, DECODING THE U.S. CORPORATE TAX
(2009) (discussing the concept, operation, and potential objectives of the corporate tax).
42. Pratt, supra note 2, at 1061. There are, of course, many other differences,
including those in the sourcing rules for interest and dividends. See I.R.C. § 861(a). These
rules determine where interest and dividend payments should be for international tax
purposes. Id. However, these are less important for the purpose of this Article's analysis.
43. See I.R.C. §§ 1(a), 1(h)(11) (revealing how certain qualified dividends are taxed at
the preferred long-term capital gains rate of 15%, while maximum federal tax rates for
individuals on other sources of income can go as high as 35%).
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the investors only when actually received. In contrast, because
interest is considered to be an obligation likely to be fulfilled,
investors are required to include (and corporate issuers are allowed to
deduct) interest payments as they accrue-even if the issuer is not
obligated to transfer any payment to the investor.'
In most cases, the above characteristics provide corporate
managers with a clear incentive to finance corporations through debt
rather than equity.45 The interest deduction provides them with a tax
shield that increases after-tax earnings, and the timing rules allow
them to deduct interest sooner and to relish the time value of the
taxes saved.46 Furthermore, the effective tax rate on interest payments
would typically be lower than the effective tax rate on dividends so
that from a (pure) tax perspective, investors would prefer interest
payments over dividends as well.47
44. See I.R.C. § 163(e). Consider the (simplified) example of a bond with a two-year
maturity period in which the corporation promises to pay $121. The risk associated with
this promise is priced by the market as justifying a 10% annual interest rate, which means
that the bond would be sold for $100. At the end of the first year, the issuer would be
permitted to deduct $10 of deemed interest payments, and the investor, if subject to U.S.
tax laws, would be required to include those payments in its gross income. At the end of
the following year, the issuer would transfer $121 to the investor out of which $21 are
interest payments. Since $10 of interest payments have already been accrued in the
previous year, the issuer will only get to deduct $11 from its income and the investor will
only be required to include this same amount.
45. I.R.C. § 243 generally allows domestic corporate shareholders a deduction for a
portion of dividends they receive from their subsidiaries. The amount of the deductible
portion is a function of the investment position held by the corporate shareholder.
However, when those dividends are eventually paid to non-corporate investors, they are
subject to any investor level taxes on those dividends.
46. The time value of accelerating the deductions could be understood in the
following manner: when the corporation is allowed to take a deduction sooner, it is able to
reduce its tax liability. It could then take the money it saved from reducing its taxes and
invest it in a short-term U.S. Treasury bill, which is considered a risk-free debt instrument,
and gain some interest on it, which reflects the value of "renting" the money. On deferral,
see MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH J. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 303-08 (3d ed. 1995).
47. In the current rate structure, the statutory corporate tax rate is 35%, exactly the
same as the maximum individual tax rate and somewhat lower than the top effective
marginal rate on equity investments. I.R.C. § 11. The top real tax rate on equity
investments, which includes the tax rate on both the corporate level and on the (domestic)
shareholder level and assumes both of them are borne solely by the shareholders, is
44.75%. To understand the higher real tax rate on equity investments, let us assume that a
corporation earns $1000 and pays all of its gains as dividends. The corporate income tax is
35%, so the corporation would pay $350 of corporate income tax and would distribute
$650 to investors, who would have to pay 15% tax on the dividends, leaving them with
$552.50. Alternatively, assume that the corporation would not distribute any dividends but
instead retains the earnings-so that the value of the corporate share would increase by
$650. If the investors sell the shares, they would be subject to a 15% tax on the $650
appreciation. In this scenario, the effective tax rate on the equity investor is therefore
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The key tax advantage of debt is, however, anchored in the
deductibility of interest payments on the corporate level. The tax paid
by investors on interest and dividends may vary significantly
depending on their annual income,' residency (for tax purposes),49
and tax status (many key investors are either tax-exempt50 or tax-
indifferent51). Calculating the tax rate that investors in corporate
equity face at the shareholder level is therefore a complicated matter,
and this Article will address this issue in the Parts that follow.
There is, therefore, an inherent inconsistency between the
economics of the debt-equity distinction and its tax treatment. From
an economic perspective, debt and equity instruments are two ends of
a risk-return continuum-the difference between them is a matter of
degree. Their binary tax classification, however, suggests that they are
two mutually exclusive categories subject to non-linear tax
treatment-one deductible and the other not.52
44.75%. This calculation of the "real" tax rate on equity assumes that all the corporate tax
is borne by investors. There is, however, much controversy over the incidence of the
corporate tax-some of which is borne by employees, suppliers, and consumers. See
generally Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11686, 2005), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w1l686.pdf (providing a literature review of the question of
who bears the burden of the corporate tax).
48. I.R.C. § 1.
49. For example, foreign taxpayers are subject to a 30% statutory rate on all the
dividends and interest payments they receive from United States persons. See I.R.C.
§§ 871(a), 881(a). However, double-tax treaties tend to significantly reduce the statutory
rate. Double tax treaties are bilateral, and the tax rates are subject to negotiations
between countries. However, as a general matter, the tax rates on dividends tend to be
higher (taxes on dividends tend to range from 5 to 15%) than those rates imposed upon
interest payments (taxes on interest payments tend to range from 0 to 5%). See Ilan
Benshalom, The Quest to Tax Interest Income: Stages in the Development of International
Taxation, 27 VA. TAX REV. 631, 664-67 (2008).
50. The tax paid on pension funds and certain foreign portfolio investors that invest in
debt instruments may vary. These taxpayers are defined in I.R.C. §§ 503, 881(c).
51. Financial institutions whose income is computed with reference to all of their
earnings (including the appreciation and depreciation in the values of unrealized assets)
are generally tax-indifferent. These types of financial institutions are defined in I.R.C.
§ 475.
52. To the extent that any tax advantage should be provided by debt, it is not clear
that it should be provided in an "all-or-nothing" manner. Instead of completely
disallowing the deduction of dividend payments, the tax advantage could have been
provided in a gradual continuous manner which would have correlated the advantage to
the instrument's position on the hypothetical debt-equity continuum. Some returns from
hybrids could be recognized as dividends and some as interest payments. A good example
of such hybrids is preferred stock. See infra note 212 and accompanying text.
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The Code's clear bias in favor of debt is believed to be one of the
main "tax" factors that led to the current financial crisis.53 That
financial firms have an incentive and a tendency to over-leverage
their activities in order to lower their costs of capital is well known.54
However, one of the reasons the current crisis has moved from the
financial sector to the real economy is that the basic tax incentive to
leverage exists for all corporations. For years, the double corporate
tax system has encouraged investors to increase their leverage, which
thereby increases their long-term costs of financial distress, in order
to deduct their interest payments and maximize their short-term
after-tax income.55 Additionally, it has been persuasively argued that
the interest deduction discourages investments in potentially high-
yield, yet risky, ventures involving research and development and
intangibles that do not have the stable earnings pattern required for a
corporation to manage high debt capacity.5 6 This discouragement runs
against the general economic convention that governments should
encourage these types of activities and perhaps even subsidize them. 7
Since the classification of an instrument as debt or equity may
entail significant tax advantages, corporate issuers and investors have
an incentive to design instruments that fall under a favorable tax
classification. Therefore, financial markets may show high demand
for hybrid instruments that are classified as debt but have many
equity characteristics. 8 This type of tax arbitrage raises serious
efficiency, equity, and revenue concerns because the resources
53. Martin A. Sullivan, Deleveraging the Tax Code, 120 TAX NOTES 1241, 1241 (2008).
The other main tax factor was the deduction for mortgage interest payments. See I.R.C.
§ 163(h). There were, of course other non-tax factors, including loose monetary and
financial regulatory regimes, financial accounting that provided mangers with incentives to
maximize income-per-share, and lack of consumer protection regulation to prevent
imprudent borrowing and lending.
54. Sullivan, supra note 53, at 1242.
55. This fact has not escaped the Treasury. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 81 (2007), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases
/reports/hp749_approachesstudy.pdf; DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY
CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS BACKGROUND
PAPER 25 (2007), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/07230%
20r.pdf. A similar analysis was provided nearly two decades ago by the Joint Committee
on Taxation. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 101ST CONG., FEDERAL INCOME TAX
ASPECTS OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES 53-58 (Comm. Print 1989).
56. Michael S. Knoll, Taxing Prometheus: How the Corporate Interest Deduction
Discourages Innovation and Risk-Taking, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1461, 1465-66, 1492-93 (1993).
57. This view is reflected in other I.R.C. sections. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 41, 1235.
58. Knoll, supra note 2, at 203 (providing an example for how such a tax arbitrage
could easily be achieved). Less frequently, investors may use hybrids to attain the opposite
results-so that an instrument with debt characteristics would be classified as equity.
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invested are geared solely to provide (privileged) taxpayers a tax
advantage at the expense of other taxpayers. These resources are
therefore wasteful from a macro-social perspective and inequitable.59
This tax-planning activity also helps corporations substitute their
traditional equity instruments for more debt-flavored instruments
that qualify as debt for tax purposes. This substitution increases
corporations' leverage and the negative externalities associated with
it-namely the risk of bankruptcy.6' However, it is important to note
that the ability of corporate issuers to attain debt classification via tax
planning does not dictate a higher leverage rate. Corporations may
use their ability to attain debt classification through tax planning to
issue more equity-flavored instruments instead of their traditional
debt instruments.6" For the purposes of this Article, it is not necessary
to resolve the empirical question of whether tax planning increases or
decreases corporations' risk of bankruptcy and financial distress. It is
enough to note that nothing in the vague debt-equity classification is
designed to curtail tax planning that increases corporate leverage or
to promote tax planning that reduces it.
To be sure, even if the distinction between debt and equity were
clear, the preferred tax treatment of debt is bound to somewhat
increase corporations' reliance on debt financing. Some of the
negative effects of high corporate leverage are therefore inherent to
the deductibility of interest payments.62 However, taxpayers' ability to
design hybrid instruments that qualify for debt classification allows
corporations to stretch their reliance on these instruments to finance
their operations, which results in a significant erosion of the corporate
tax base.63
59. Scott Marc Kolbrenner, Derivatives Design and Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 211,
281 (1995); David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Aggressive Tax
Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1351-54 (2000); David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About
Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 222-25 (2002).
60. See infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
61. The ability to invest in hybrid instruments may attract investors that otherwise
would invest in equity and increase the negative consequences of excessive leverage. On
the other hand, these instruments may also attract investors that otherwise would invest in
debt, which means that the equity components of the hybrid instrument may actually
reduce some of leverage's negative consequences.
62. See Sullivan, supra note 53, at 1242-43.
63. Lee A. Sheppard, Wall Street Rules: Feline PRIDES Get IRS Imprimatur, 100 TAX
NOTEs 619, 619-20 (2003) (arguing that Rev. Rul. 2003-97 allows tax planners to carve a
debt instrument out of every instrument and that this unduly erodes the corporate tax
base); Adam 0. Emmerich, Comment, Hybrid Instruments and the Debt-Equity
Distinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 118, .21 (1985) ("If the Service
always allowed these hybrid instruments to be treated as debt for tax purposes, most
distributions eventually would be made pursuant to these instruments, and the use of
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B. The Doctrinal Answer
While the different tax treatment is explicitly stated in the
Code,' the legislative guidance on how to distinguish debt from
equity is brief. After failing to enact detailed comprehensive
legislation that would have better defined these two categories,65
Congress enacted Code section 385, which implicitly assumes that
there is a distinction between debt and equity.6 Section 385 does not
clearly state the distinction but, instead, assigns broad authority to the
Treasury to enact regulations to make this distinction67 -stating only
a few factors that the regulations may include.68 The Treasury
published such regulations in 1980, but they were quickly
withdrawn.69
Due to this lack of legislative guidance, 7° much of the debt-
equity distinction is based on federal common law. Over the years, it
seems as though courts have been reluctant to prescribe any
benchmarks that taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service (the
"IRS") could use to clearly make this distinction. Instead, courts have
dealt with the need to distinguish debt and equity instruments on a
case-by-case basis while relying on an amalgam of factors generated
over the years by common law wisdom. Courts have sought to
'ordinary' equity would decline sharply. As a result, the corporate income tax would be
reduced to little more than a tax on retained earnings.").
64. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(a) (2006) (granting deductions for interest payments but not
for dividends).
65. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68 Stat. 730. The House's
version of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code contained definitions designed to indicate
precisely what instruments would qualify as debt. The Senate dropped these definitions,
however. See id.
66. This was added as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. See Tax Reform Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 385 (2006)).
67. I.R.C. § 385(a).
68. I.R.C. § 385(b) ("(1) whether there is a written unconditional promise to pay on
demand or on a specified date a sum certain in money ... , (2) whether there is
subordination to or preference over any indebtedness of the corporation, (3) the ratio of
debt to equity of the corporation, (4) whether there is convertibility into the stock of the
corporation, and (5) the relationship between holdings of stock in the corporation and
holdings of the interest in question.").
69. Withdrawal of Treasury Decision 7747 Relating to Debt and Equity, 48 Fed. Reg.
31,053, 31,053 (July 6, 1983) (codified as amended at 26 C.F.R. § 1 (2009)). For a
description of this failed regulatory endeavor, see Polito, supra note 34, at 783-90;
Emmerich, supra note 63, at 128-33.
70. There are some more narrowly tailored Code provisions dealing with the
classification of specific instruments. For example, I.R.C. § 163(1), which denies the
deduction for interest paid or accrued on indebtedness that is payable in stock of the
issuer. A few other examples where the Code recharacterizes or limits the tax benefit
associated with either a debt or equity classification are I.R.C. §§ 163(e)(5), 249, 279,
351(g), and 356(e).
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determine the character of an investment according to the nature of
the issuer-investor relationship7 -- defining the stockholder as taking
part in the "corporate adventure" and the creditor as a party that is
entitled to receive payments "independently of risk and success [of
the corporation]. 72
This judicial inquiry has gained understandable notoriety due to
its convoluted mix of factors and inconsistent outcomes.73 Courts,
followed by the IRS in revenue ruling procedures,74 have identified
numerous criteria to weigh in determining whether a given
instrument should be classified as debt or equity. These criteria
include: the parties' intent; whether the investors operate under a
dual capacity of both shareholders and creditors and their role in
managing the corporation; the availability of equivalent funding
sources from third parties; the level of corporate leverage and the risk
associated with the corporation's line of business; the formal title of
the instruments; subordination to other corporate debt in cases of
bankruptcy; voting power; the provision of fixed payments and their
contingency; the source of the payments; a fixed maturity date; and
whether the corporation has the option of buying back the
instrument.75 Courts, however, have not confined themselves to any
list of factors and have been reluctant to determine any decisive
factors.76 Some commentators have argued that courts actually use
many more factors.77 Further complicating the distinction, every
federal circuit has developed a slightly different list of factors. 8
Clearly, the sheer number of factors allows an infinite number of
possible combinations, making it extremely difficult to determine in
71. David P. Hariton, The Taxation of Complex Financial Instruments, 43 TAX L.
REV. 731, 768-69 (1988) (referring to this approach as the "traditional approach").
72. See, e.g., Comm'r v. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1935).
73. Weisbach, supra note 18, at 1638.
74. Rev. Rul. 2003-97, 2003-2 C.B. 380; David P. Hariton, Distinguishing Between
Equity and Debt in the New Financial Environment, 49 TAX L. REV. 499, 503 (1994) (citing
the list of factors distinguished by I.R.S. Notice 94-47, 1994-1 C.B. 357, which closely
resembles the list of common law factors singled out by the courts).
75. Polito, supra note 34, at 781; Pratt, supra note 2, at 1068.
76. John Kelley Co. v. Comm'r, 326 U.S. 521, 533-34 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Dixie Dairies Corp. v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 476, 493-94 (1980).
77. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 39, at 463.
78. Christensen, supra note 22, at 1313-14 (providing a comprehensive list of the
different factors that each circuit relies upon for making this distinction-for example, the
Tenth Circuit is the only one that considers ability to liquidate the loan, the First Circuit is
the only one that considers use of customary loan documentation, and the Third Circuit
considers a number of "unique" factors: e.g., timing of the advance with reference to the
organization of the corporation, provision for redemption at the option of the holder,
provision for redemption by the corporation, and contingency on the obligation to repay).
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advance how courts will classify a given hybrid on the debt-equity
continuum. For example, how could investors know what a
"reasonable" rate of leverage is? How should one classify a hybrid
instrument which grants its owner an option to convert the instrument
into a common share but until conversion pays a fixed periodic
interest rate and has a predetermined termination date? Would the
classification of this hybrid instrument change if some of the
payments were contingent on the entity's performance, the S&P 500
Index, or the fluctuation of the interest rates? What will happen if the
instrument's payments would be contingent on a complicated formula
that involves all three factors?
To prevent granting sophisticated taxpayers a roadmap for
avoidance, both the courts and the IRS have been careful to avoid
creating any safe harbors or clear lines to distinguish between debt
and equity.79 Uncertainty, therefore, was not the problem of the debt-
equity distinction-it was the solution chosen by courts and the IRS
and endorsed by Congressional silence. This uncertainty came at a
substantial price, however. The reliance of many Code provisions on
the classification of an investment as debt or equity and, most
importantly, the material financial consequences the classification
often involves' make the debt-equity distinction one of the most
frequently litigated issues in tax law.8
II. CORRECTLY IDENTIFYING REAL-WORLD PROBLEMS-A
PREREQUISITE
This Article argues that to reform reality tax policy makers
should first identify why the current rules were promulgated and
determine whether these reasons are still applicable. Only after
understanding what function the rules were intended to perform
should policy makers try to determine what function the rules can and
should have in relation to contemporary challenges. This "historical"
inquiry should not be perceived as a purely academic exercise.
Rather, in order to avoid the problem of policy makers' path
dependency, the inquiry should be a critical and reflexive process that
tries to identify the conventional origins by which we operate today.
This problem occurs when policy makers embrace a set of explicit or
implicit assumptions used in the past without first critically examining
whether these assumptions are still valid. This Part explores why the
79. Pratt, supra note 2, at 1068.
80. Christensen, supra note 22, at 1311.
81. Id. at 1310.
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rules distinguishing debt and equity were reasonable when they were
adopted, why they are incompatible with the problems they are
required to solve today, and how the tension between what they are
supposed to be doing and what they actually achieve is reflected in
the doctrinal analysis.
A. The Brave New World of Corporate Investments
The rules distinguishing debt and equity rely on conceptions
generated at the beginning of the twentieth century, when Congress
instated the double tax on corporate investment.' Since then, the
rules have been essentially stagnant, developing only through
relatively minor incremental changes.83 Economic reality, however,
has dramatically changed.
Today's financial investment markets are ever changing. A
number of phenomena that distinguish contemporary markets from
those of the first half of the twentieth century are of particular
relevance for this inquiry: the change in corporate and individual tax
rates; the growing role of portfolio investment in public corporations;
and the rise of derivative financial instruments. The impact of these
changes is difficult to overstate. It means that we distinguish debt
from equity using rules that are not only incoherent and obsolete but
also were designed to deal with completely different investment
vehicles.
The debt-equity distinction has been profoundly affected by the
changing role of private versus public corporations in the modern
economy. Many of the corporations in the beginning of the previous
century were closely held private corporations incorporated primarily
to attain limited liability. Today, limited liability is available in a
variety of entities-most of them not subject to the corporate tax
(e.g., limited liability companies ('LLCs"), which are taxed as pass-
through partnerships).' Following the Treasury's "check-the-box"
regulations,85 which allow taxpayers to choose the tax classification of
82. Steven A. Bank, The Story of Double Taxation, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 153,
153-76 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005) (explaining the political dynamics that
led to the double tax on corporate investment during the late 1930s).
83. See supra note 70 (discussing Code provisions that, though narrowly tailored, seek
to classify certain instruments).
84. See RICHARD L. DOERNBERG, HOWARD E. ABRAMS & DON A. LEATHERMAN,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS 473-83 (4th ed.
2009).
85. See I.R.C. § 7704(a) (2006) (prescribing that with few exceptions publicly traded
partnerships be taxed as corporations); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2, -3 (as amended in 2009).
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most non-publicly traded entities, the corporate tax now raises
revenues primarily from large public corporations and should be
perceived as a tax on the access to public markets. 6
A new pattern of portfolio investments and dispersed corporate
ownership accompanied the shift in the types of corporations subject
to the corporate tax.87 Portfolio investments are made by individuals
and corporations seeking a diversified portfolio of financial assets and
a high (net) return on their investments-not control of a specific
entity.8 These investments are volatile, mobile, and dispersed among
various types of investors-many of which are not United States
taxpayers. 9 More importantly for tax purposes, most corporations
subject to corporate tax are public, thus their debt and equity
securities are liquid. This has a fundamental effect on the debt-equity
distinction. Unlike the investors of solvent but closely held
corporations, where minority shareholders are always concerned that
controlling shareholders will not distribute the profits, the investors in
instruments issued by corporations such as IBM and Microsoft care
much less about the timing of distributions. The available secondary
markets take account of corporations' retained earnings and allow
investors to easily sell their investments.9' Additionally, even though
dividend payments are supposed to be paid from the corporations'
residual profits, publicly traded firms have fairly strict dividend
The regulations allow most entities to choose whether they are taxed as a corporation or a
pass-through entity/partnership. Id.
86. Pratt, supra note 2, at 1057, 1111-13 (stating that the Treasury enacted the "check-
the-box" regulations which allow most privately owned business entities to elect to be
taxed as a partnership and to avoid the double tax even if they have limited liability and
other corporate features). See generally TAX POLICY CTR., TAX ITEMS 1998-2006 (2009),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.orgtaxfacts/ContentlPDF/corp-taxitems.pdf (showing that
even though the returns of large corporations, which are defined as corporations with
annual receipts exceeding $250,000, account for only about 0.1% of the total corporate tax
returns, they account for more than 85% of the corporate tax revenues).
87. Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 TAX
L. REV. 537, 542-45 (2003) (detailing the growth of U.S. taxpayers' portfolio investments
since the beginning of the 1990s); Pratt, supra note 2, at 1057. Portfolio investors are
investors that seek to diversify their investment in order to minimize the risk of investing
in only a few firms and industries. These investors tend to buy small amounts of shares and
securities issued by a wide variety of firms, and do not try to exercise any control over
them. This often results in a dispersed ownership structure of many publicly traded
corporations-that is when no shareholder or group of shareholders have a control block
in the corporation.
88. Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 87, at 547-54 (outlining the key distinctions
between direct and portfolio investments, and arguing that the latter are more volatile,
short-term, and responsive to bottom-line returns and financial markets).
89. Id.
90. Hariton, supra note 71, at 770.
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payment policies. 91 Legally, corporations can deviate from their
pronounced dividend policy and not pay the dividends. However, the
management of public corporations tends to make extreme efforts to
avoid such a move because it would disrupt the market's pricing of
their equity shares. 2
Changes in the tax rate structure since the inception of the
corporate tax are also relevant to the debt-equity distinction. In the
last quarter-century, there has been a material change in the top
marginal tax rates for corporations and individuals. 93 From the late
1930s until the 1980s, there was a substantial gap between the
corporate tax rate (most of this period between 40-50%) and the
individual tax rates (the top marginal rate was never below 70% and
was more than 80-91% for a period of about 20 years).94 The non-
deductibility of dividends from the corporate tax rate imposed a
potentially high "real" tax rate on equity investments, which could
reach up to about 96% when the proceeds of such investments were
distributed in the form of dividends.95
Despite the tax penalty on the distribution of dividends, it is
important to recognize that incorporation was a tax-favored
investment vehicle for most of the twentieth century. The relatively
low corporate tax rate made the practice of retaining earnings in
corporations an effective tax-deferral mechanism-allowing income
to compound and accumulate while being subject to significantly
lower statutory and effective tax rates. It also provided shareholders
with incentives to seek other non-dividend forms of distribution (e.g.,
redemption, liquidation),96 which typically were subject to a lower
capital gains rate (for most of that period, between 12.5-35% on
assets held for long periods of time).97 Accordingly, before the 1980s,
equity-flavored debt that allowed the deduction of interest payments
would have potentially exposed investors to high individual income
tax rates on those payments. Hence, investors were less concerned
91. See BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 36, at 415-18.
92. Cf id. at 428-29 (discussing how publicly traded companies pay dividends to
stockholders). The drop in share price may result in ownership change and the growing
readiness of shareholders to replace management. Id.
93. See infra Appendix A.
94. See infra Appendix A.
95. In 1960, the corporate tax rate was 52% and the top marginal income tax rate for
individuals was 91%. See infra Appendix A. This meant that the real tax would have been
roughly 96% (1 - (1 - .52) x (1 - .91) z .96). For a detailed discussion of the real corporate
tax rate, see supra note 47.
96. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 302, 304, 331, 332, 334, 336 (2006).
97. See GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 46, at 565-68 (providing an account of the
historic development of the very complex capital gains rate structure).
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about using deductible interest payments to avoid the corporate tax
because the corporate tax mechanism, along with the low capital
gains rates imposed on non-dividend distributions, was the tax
shelter.98 This legal tax shelter provided taxpayers a secure way to
avoid paying high individual income taxes on their corporate
investments. 9 For example, in 1954, investors subject to the high
individual marginal tax rate who undertook a five-year corporate
investment with a pre-tax return of 10% could have increased their
nominal after-tax returns by 285%-650% if, instead of receiving
dividends and interest payments, they retained corporate earnings
and liquidated their holdings at the end of the period." °
This rate structure has irrevocably changed, however. The
greatest change occurred as part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act,10 1
which significantly reduced the gap between the high marginal
statutory tax rates on individuals and corporations." 2 Up until that
period, the top individual marginal tax rates were almost always
significantly higher than the top corporate tax rates.0 3 However, in
1988, when the new rates came into effect, the top individual tax rate
(28%) was actually lower than the top corporate tax rate (34%).104
Since the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003,05
top marginal tax rates for individuals and corporations have been set
identically at 35%, and the statutory tax rate on dividend payments
and most capital gains has been at 15%.106 The "real" tax rate on the
dividend proceeds of equity investment is now limited to about
45%, 1° although the actual real effective tax rate is probably much
98. For a numerical example, see Warren, supra note 21, at 723.
99. Calvin H. Johnson, The Incredible Shrinking Domain of Corporate Stock, 103 TAX
NOTES 871, 871 (2004) (pointing out that individual tax rates were so high in the 1970s
that the combination of corporate and capital gains tax would be two to three times better
"than a single individual tax for a long-haul investment").
100. See infra Appendix B. This example assumes that the interest and dividend
payments would have been re-invested in the corporate solution.
101. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified at 26 U.S.C.
§ 1 (2006)).
102. Id. § 101, 100 Stat. at 2096.
103. See infra Appendices A, B.
104. See infra Appendices A, B.
105. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27,
117 Stat. 752 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)).
106. Id. §§ 105, 301, 117 Stat. at 755, 758.
107. Real tax rate = 1 - (1 - corporate tax rate) x (1 - dividend tax rate) = 1 - (1 -
0.35) x (1 - 0.15) = 0.4475.
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lower (around 36%), given that the effective average tax rate on
corporations is estimated to be 26%.lo
In essence, the changes in the corporate tax rates during the
1980s metamorphosed the double corporate tax system. Before 1988,
it was a tax shelter. After 1988, however, it became a tax penalty.
Since the 1988 rates came into effect, the real tax rate on equity
investments has been greater than the high marginal tax rate imposed
on individuals. 10 9
In the post-1988 years, where the top statutory corporate and
individual tax rates are roughly similar,"0 individual investors subject
to United States income tax prefer to pay the individual tax rate on
interest payments than to pay higher real rates on equity
investments."' For example, investors now subject to the highest
individual marginal tax rate, undertaking a five-year corporate
investment with a pre-tax return of 10%, could increase their after-tax
returns by 117% if they received the returns in the form of interest
payments and refrained from retaining corporate earnings."2
108. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAXING CAPITAL INCOME: EFFECTIVE RATES AND
APPROACHES TO REFORM 7-9 (2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/67xx/
doc6792/10-18-Tax.pdf (suggesting that the combined tax rate on equity investments is
36% and that the average tax rate on investment in corporations is about 26%). See
STEVE MAGUIRE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AVERAGE EFFECTIVE CORPORATE TAX
RATES: 1959-2002, at 4 (2003) (showing that in the period of 1988-2002 the average
federal corporate tax rate exceeded 27% only in the years 1999 and 2000); see also DEP'T
OF THE TREASURY, APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S.
BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM, supra note 55, at 82 (reaching a slightly different figure of 39.7%,
instead of 36%, for the real effective tax rate on corporate investment). For additional
estimates, see ROBERT CARROLL, TAX FOUND., COMPARING INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATE TAX RATES: U.S. CORPORATE TAX RATE INCREASINGLY OUT OF LINE BY
VARIOUS MEASURES 3 (2008), available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/files/ff143.pdf
(suggesting that the effective tax rate on marginal corporate investments is around 24%);
ROBERT MCINTYRE & T.D. Coo NGUYEN, CITIZENS FOR TAX JUSTICE & THE INST. ON
TAXATION & ECON. POL'Y, CORPORATE INCOME TAXES IN THE BUSH YEARS 19-28
(2004), available at www.ctj.org/corpfed04an.pdf (providing data that suggests that the top
275 United States multinationals paid an average effective tax rate of 17.3% in the years
2001-2003 and that in some industries the rates were below 15%); see also JOEL
FRIEDMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, THE DECLINE OF CORPORATE
INCOME TAX REVENUES 7 (2003), available at http://www.cbpp.org/10-16-03tax.htm
(providing some further information as to how corporations are able to attain these low
tax rates); Arlen & Weiss, supra note 3, at 342-46 (demonstrating how corporations are
able to reduce their effective tax rates through tax subsidies for new investments in the
form of accelerated depreciation and investment credits).
109. See infra Appendices A, B.
110. See infra Appendices A, B.
111. For a concrete numerical example, see infra Appendix B.
112. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
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In the current tax rate structure, deductible interest payments
frequently offer only a relatively minor tax benefit to taxpayers
subject to the top individual marginal tax rate. These benefits may
be outweighed by other potential advantages of equity (e.g., higher
returns). However, it is also important to note that many investors
have tax-exempt status or are foreigners.114 These taxpayers may be
subject to a 0%, or otherwise very low, effective tax rate on interest
payments paid to them by a corporation that is a United States
resident." 5 If the interest payment is deducted by the corporation and
not taxed at the investor level, then the return on the investment is
effectively free from United States income tax.
Another point of disconnect between the current rules and the
modern economy relates to the role of financial engineering. In 1909,
when the corporate tax was first imposed, 6 the tax law distinction
was made in reference to a well-identified business law distinction
between debt and equity." 7 Up until the early 1970s, investment
vehicles issued to the public were limited to a number of familiar
categories, which correlated the investment experience with a certain
amount of risk.118 While the list of categories gradually expanded to
include investment vehicles other than debt and equity-e.g., futures
in certain commodities and basic put and call options-the risk and
return positions of the parties that owned publicly issued instruments
were relatively straightforward and easy to categorize. This
fundamentally changed as Wall Street started to explore the
boundaries of modern finance theory and to experiment with
113. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 108, at 7-9 (calculating that the average
effective tax rate on equity investment-which combines the corporate tax and the
shareholder tax-is 36%). Although there is still some tax benefit associated with
retaining corporate earnings, the corporate tax offers little tax benefit to corporations that
retain earnings instead of paying dividends. See infra Appendix B.
114. Knoll, supra note 28, at 131.
115. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
116. See Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11 (repealed 1913). Some
earlier versions of the civil war income tax included shareholders' investment in corporate
entities and certain dividend payments in the individual income tax base. See generally
Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax, 43
WM. & MARY L. REv. 447 (2001) (discussing whether different theories about the
corporate nature really had a significant impact on the development of the corporate tax).
117. Polito, supra note 34, at 778.
118. Pratt, supra note 2, at 1075-77; Warren, supra note 2, at 460. For a somewhat
different view, see generally Michael S. Knoll, The Ancient Roots of Modern Financial
Innovation: The Early History of Regulatory Arbitrage (Univ. Pa., Inst. for Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 04-11, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractid=555972 (suggesting that while many consider financial innovation modem, it
can be traced back hundreds of years).
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financial engineering. Financial experts realized that financial assets
represent intangible rights with respect to a potential stream of cash
flow-and therefore, unlike the real economy, could be divided in an
infinite number of ways. 9 Through a process that may strike
laypersons as alchemy, debt and equity instruments can be
decomposed and recombined resulting in an array of instruments that
allow investors and issuers to establish different risk-cost-return
exposures,12°  to obtain favorable accounting and credit-rating
treatment, and to benefit from tax and regulatory arbitrages. 2' Slicing
and dicing the debt-equity bundle of rights produces hybrid
instruments (which have both debt and equity characteristics);
119. Pratt, supra note 2, at 1056-57.
120. George C. Howell III & Cameron N. Cosby, Exotic Coupon Stripping: A Voyage
to the Frontier Between Debt and Option, 12 VA. TAX REV. 531, 533-50 (1993) (providing
examples for how different derivatives can be issued from what was once considered to be
a single debt coupon issuing debt instrument).
121. The ability to exploit arbitrages emerges out of the inconsistent treatment of
equivalent cash flows. The most common and easiest way to illustrate this point is to
examine how equivalent cash flows could be generated through the simple use of the put-
call parity theorem.
The theorem holds that given any three of the following four financial
instruments-a zero-coupon bond with a face value of E, PV(E), a share of stock,
S, a call option on the share that matures when the bond matures and that has a
strike price equal to the face value of the bond, C, and a put with the same
maturity and strike price as the call, P-it is possible to synthesize the fourth. The
most intuitive means of writing the theorem expresses the bond in terms of the
other three instruments:
PV(E) = S + P - C (1)
Focusing on tax characterization only, and ignoring timing for the moment,
the bond produces interest, which is taxable as ordinary income, whereas the
portfolio consisting of the stock, the held put, and the written call produces capital
gain. Currently, the maximum federal tax rate on ordinary income is 39.6%,
whereas the maximum federal tax rate on capital gains is 28%. Thus, the two sides
of the transaction are taxed differently: For taxpayers in the top bracket, the left
side of Equation 1 is taxed at a higher rate than the right.
The tax arbitrage possibility arises because the taxpayer can borrow using the
left side of Equation 1, by issuing the bond, and using the proceeds to purchase the
portfolio on the right side. The taxpayer will never have a net pretax cash flow
from this arrangement because the cash flows on the opposite sides of the
transaction offset one another. Because the taxpayer's interest deductions are
deductible at a higher tax rate (39.6%) than the rate at which her gain is taxed
(28%), she will generate a positive after-tax cash flow (11.6% of the amount
borrowed).
Knoll, supra note 2, at 203-04 (citations omitted); see also EDGAR, supra note 37, at 21-25
(discussing how the put-call parity can achieve financial equivalence and through it tax
planning objectives); Shaviro, supra note 2, at 652-53 (same); Warren, supra note 2, at
465-67 (same).
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option-embedded instruments-those with an ability to convert, buy,
or sell a certain asset at a certain price in a given time;122 and "NOT"
instruments, which can be classified as neither debt nor equity. 123
Even more interesting is the fact that investors can buy different
slices from different issuers to create synthetic positions that mimic
the cash flow of debt or equity instruments. 124 In the past, investors
interested in investing in a corporation had to buy instruments issued
by it, but the explosive development of new types of financial
instruments allowed investors to buy different positions which
entailed options with respect to any company from any
counterparty.'2 1 Furthermore, investors were no longer limited in
making those bets with regard to any specific company and could rely
on market indices.1 26 Taxpayers' ability to construct these synthetic
instruments is far-reaching because it makes it possible to replicate
cash flows and risks associated with a certain asset through the use of
derivatives-thus avoiding the need to actually own them. This ability
makes it considerably more difficult for tax authorities to develop
risk-based ownership rules to determine if a taxpayer "owns" a
position with respect to a specific corporation.127 Taxing synthetic
positions is difficult because tax authorities, and indeed even the
taxpayers themselves, may find it difficult to identify related positions
in complicated diversified portfolios and to match them with each
other. 128
B. Why the Doctrine Fails-the Ghost of Dual Capacity
The criteria for distinguishing between debt and equity originate
in case law. The second-best reality agenda seeks to promote a
politically realistic solution. It therefore assumes the immutability of
122. A particularly interesting thing about these instruments is that there is no
theoretical explanation for why the option should be bundled and not sold separately. See
generally Edward D. Kleinbard, Taxing Convertible Debt: A Layman's Perspective, 56
SMU L. REV. 453 (2003) (criticizing Strnad's explanation for why convertible debt exists);
Jeff Strnad, Taxing Convertible Debt, 56 SMU L. REV. 399 (2003) (providing an
explanation for the existence of convertible debt under the signaling theory).
123. Michael S. Farber, Equity, Debt, NOT-The Tax Treatment of Non-Debt Open
Transactions, 60 TAX LAW. 635, 636-37 (2007).
124. Pratt, supra note 2, at 1083; Herwig J. Schlunk, Little Boxes: Can Optimal
Commodity Tax Methodology Save the Debt-Equity Distinction?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 859, 861
(2002); Weisbach, supra note 25, at 495.
125. Pratt, supra note 2, at 1076, 1078.
126. Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 1326-27 (explaining how indexes are used in equity
swaps).
127. See EDGAR, supra note 37, at 33; Weisbach, supra note 25, at 506.
128. Weisbach, supra note 25, at 502-06.
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the debt-equity distinction but often does not spend enough time
understanding why the rules were generated in a specific way. The
claim in this sub-Part is that the debt-equity distinction is a clear
historic example of the law of unintended consequences. The rules,
which were originally developed to address the problem of
controlling shareholders financing their privately held corporations
through debt to avoid higher taxes on dividends, now impede public
issuings, without helping the Treasury to achieve any tax-revenue or
efficiency goals.
A short review of the leading cases in the debt-equity
jurisprudence and in those cases in the leading corporate taxation
textbooks129 (through which tax professors introduce students to this
problem) yields some interesting observations. All of the cases
involve transactions that were made prior to 1986-when the tax rate
structure was completely different than the one we have today. 3 ' All
of the cases involved private, closely held corporations, which in most
cases were family corporations.'31 In those cases, both the corporation
and the investors were United States residents for tax purposes.
13 2
Most importantly, the lenders in each case were part of a control
group of shareholders and were therefore acting under a dual
capacity of both equity holders and creditors.'33
129. See DOERENBERG, ABRAMS & LEATHERMAN, supra note 84, at 104-12
(providing as an example Bauer v. Comm'r, 748 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1984) which deals with
loans made by two controlling shareholders, a father and son-in-law, to their wholly
owned corporation); STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE
TAXATION 142-50 (2008) (providing Fin Hay as an example); ROBERT J. PERONI ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TAXATION OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 159-61 (3d ed. 2006)
(providing as an example Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States, 555 F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1977),
which refers to Fin Hay); BERNARD WOLFMAN & DIANE M. RING, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 50-63 (2008) (providing Fin Hay as an
example). See generally John Kelley Co. v. Comm'r, 326 U.S. 521 (1946) (trying to
determine if "debt" instruments issued by closely held corporations were actually debt);
Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Comm'r, 462 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1972) (trying to determine the
true nature of loans made by two controlling shareholders, a husband and wife, to their
closely held corporation); Fin Hay Realty Co. v. Comm'r, 398 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1968)
(trying to determine the true nature of transfers of capital by two controlling shareholders
to their wholly owned corporation in return for promissory notes); Gilbert v. Comm'r, 248
F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957) (dealing with a husband and a wife who claimed bad debt
deductions for advances they made to their wholly owned corporations).
130. For example, see Dominic L. Daher & Salvador D. Aceves, Interest Expense
Deductions, 536-3RD TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS A-19, A-20-24 (2007) (providing an
overview of the topic directed toward practitioners, citing numerous cases, all of which
predated the 1986 Tax Reform Act).
131. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Bauer v. Comm'r, 45 T.C. 910, 911 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 748
F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1984).
133. See, e.g., id.
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As explained above, wealthy individuals had a strong tax
incentive to shelter the profits in the corporation and engage in non-
dividend distribution.1 4 However, when deferring the distribution of
profits was costly,135 shareholders would have preferred to use
related-party debt to receive interest rather than dividend
payments. 3 6 Accordingly, all of these cases involved transfers of
funds to the entity through a transaction characterized by the
controlling shareholders as debt-a characterization that was later
challenged by the IRS on the grounds that the transfer was really an
equity investment.
137
Therefore, the doctrinal rules were set to distinguish debt from
equity in the context of related debt transactions, where most of the
relevant debt instruments under scrutiny would have been regarded
as not much more than "a piece of paper." '138 In those cases the
contractual terms may not have reflected the "real" credit exposure
of the related-party lender and may not have increased the
corporation's risk of bankruptcy in the same way debt instruments
issued to third parties would have. In fact, there may not have been
any "real" economic essence to the transaction because shareholders
were basically transferring money to themselves. The objective of
these investors was to supply the corporation they held with capital
without losing control over it, borrowing the money, or locking their
investments. Additionally, since these transactions were merely a
transfer of funds between related parties, one would expect to find
that they involved little efficiency costs, other than revenue and
compliance costs.'39
To deal with these dual capacity scenarios, the rules had to
depend on multiple factors so as to create vagueness and deprive
134. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
135. Distribution of profits might have been costly for a number of reasons: perhaps
because the shareholders were not subject to high marginal tax rates or because of
liquidity reasons, which were quite common given the lack of a secondary market for
illiquid, private, corporate assets.
136. The term related-party debt defines borrower-creditor relationships between
taxpayers that are related to each other-family members, a corporation, and controlling
shareholders.
137. See supra note 129.
138. See H. David Rosenbloom, Address, Banes of an Income Tax: Legal Fictions,
Elections, Hypothetical Determinations, Related Party Debt, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 17, 17
(2004) (examining tax treatment of related-party debt).
139. The legal label that private related parties assign to their transfer of funds should
have little or no economic meaning. For example, since a controlling shareholder is
considerably less likely to force its controlled corporation into bankruptcy because of its
failure to pay the debt, the corporation has no enhanced risk of bankruptcy costs as a
result of borrowing the debt.
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sophisticated tax planners the benefit of certainty. Furthermore, in
these scenarios, where the written contract offered only weak
evidence of the real essence of the transaction, the attempt to
distinguish between debt and equity through analogy had to fall on
petty, almost smell-test distinctions, no matter how big the tax
consequences were. Hence, although it may be difficult for some to
admit, the doctrinal rules distinguishing debt and equity instruments
probably offered an adequate solution in the context of the problems
they were originally meant to solve-investments by dual capacity
shareholders in closely held corporations.
Yet these rules fail miserably today because most of the
corporate tax base is comprised of large public corporations that have
dispersed ownership.14 Those companies issue liquid instruments to a
group of anonymous investors that care only about cash flow and do
not care at all about directly controlling the operations of the
corporation. Hybrid instruments classified as debt produce deductible
payments but also impose a real efficiency cost because, like debt,
they may increase corporations' bankruptcy risk.
Most importantly, in the current rate structure, it seems as
though tax authorities should not care so much about the erosion of
the corporate tax base by deductible interest payments as long as
those interest payments are subject to federal income tax on the
individual level. Therefore, tax authorities should be primarily
concerned with those cases in which interest is deductible on the
corporate level but untaxed on the investor level-meaning mainly
when the investors are not United States residents for tax purposes.
III. FINDING SOLUTIONS THAT WORK: POLICY MAKING AND
COMMON SENSE
Policy makers face two options: look for an organizing principle
that prescribes what a reasonable tax system should aim to achieve in
a constrained reality or avoid looking for any broad policy solution
and limit their inquiry to a case-by-case analysis.44 Even advocates of
the case-by-case analysis are pessimistic about its ability to alleviate
the line-drawing problem.1 42 Hence, this Article turns to evaluate
what an organizing principle in a constrained reality would require,
while bearing in mind the shortcomings of the doctrinal approach.
140. See discussion supra Part II.A.
141. Strnad, supra note 2, at 604-05 (echoing this approach in his conclusion).
142. See id. at 605.
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To first start analyzing how we would like to distinguish debt
from equity we have to determine the relevant group of taxpayers
and its characteristics. The key notion is that from a policy
perspective the solution should primarily seek to resolve those
questions which involve the highest social costs (e.g., costs resulting
from the loss of revenue, the cost of tax distortions on the efficient
allocation of resources, and compliance costs). Accordingly, while
problems related to the debt-equity distinction may appear in
numerous settings, the proposed solution should not necessarily seek
to solve all of them, but rather only those that are the most important.
As mentioned above, virtually all of today's corporate tax revenues
come from large public corporations,143 and those corporations also
claim most of the interest deductions.'" Therefore, problems of
distinguishing debt from equity in this group of taxpayers should be
the core of the analysis.'45 Hence, this Article seeks to determine only
those rules that should govern the characterization of instruments
issued by corporations on public markets. At the same time, given
that the current doctrine-based rules offer a reasonable solution in
the case of private closely held corporations,4 6 the rest of the analysis
assumes these rules should continue to govern in that context.
Once the relevant group of taxpayers has been identified, it is
important to examine the sources of the problem. In the context of
public corporations, there are four main problems: the ability of tax
planners to use financial theory to design hybrid instruments with
similar cash flows but with different characterization, erosion of the
corporate tax base by deductible interest payments which are not
taxed on the shareholder level, the distortion these tax rules have on
firms' financial structure, and the vagueness of the rules and their
enormous compliance costs. Interestingly, the rules we use today
were not designed to deal with any of these problems but with
problems of dual capacity that are irrelevant in the case of portfolio
investors. For example, the difficulty of determining the "real
transaction" exists only in a dual-capacity scenario and is completely
unnecessary in the context of public corporations, where the debtor
and the issuer are unrelated and the terms of issued instruments are
clear and credible.
143. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
144. TAX POLICY CTR., supra note 86, at 8 (showing that 87% of the interest
deductions against corporate income are claimed by large, mostly public, corporations).
145. See Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 2, at 122-23; Michael S. Knoll, An Accretion
Corporate Income Tax, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1, 43 (1996).
146. For a different type of solution, see Gibson, supra note 39, at 490-91.
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Obviously, vagueness may still cause public corporations to take
more cautious positions when issuing new financial instruments, but
vagueness has its own set of social costs. Moreover, it seems likely
that corporate tax planners are in a superior position relative to the
IRS to exploit this vagueness to achieve favorable tax treatment.
Additionally, other than compliance costs, shareholder lending in
dual-capacity scenarios had little efficiency costs because of the low
credit risk associated with related-party lending. This again is not the
case with public corporations-where debt instruments are issued to
anonymous, unrelated parties, and where the credit risk associated
with these obligations is real. Therefore, the tax incentive for a
leveraged financial structure in this setting results in great inefficiency
costs.
After determining what the problems are, the next step is to
determine what our limitations are. In this scenario, two limitations
constrain our decision making. First, we cannot eliminate the debt-
equity distinction, and second, we cannot eliminate the ability of
taxpayers to hybridize debt and equity instruments-meaning that we
can limit but not eliminate tax planners' ability to engineer
instruments with nearly equivalent cash flows that appear
contractually different.
The next step is to determine, in light of the above, what policy
makers' objectives can and should be with regard to drawing the line
between debt and equity in the contemporary setting. The attribute
that emerges immediately is that the debt-equity distinction does not
matter so much in terms of revenues when it comes to domestic
shareholders.'47 This may be subject to change, but the likelihood that
the corporate tax rate will increase is relatively low because of
international tax competitive pressures.
148
Because interest payments are deductible, the return on the
investment in corporate tax is essentially not subject to the double
corporate tax regime but taxed only at the investor level. The
147. As explained above, the real effective tax rate on most equity investments is 36%,
which is only slightly higher than the top marginal tax rate of 35% set for individuals. See
supra note 107 and accompanying text. Given that most of the investments are made by
wealthy individuals who are likely to face high marginal tax rates (if they are United States
residents), the difference is not dramatic and may not justify the difficulty of vigorously
enforcing the debt-equity distinction.
148. See Graetz, supra note 12, at 84-86. The real question is whether future tax
increases will come in the form of higher taxes on dividends, higher income taxes, or some
other fiscal instrument (most likely a value-added consumption tax). For a detailed
proposal advocating a value-added tax, see Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary
Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261,282-99 (2002).
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interesting consequence is that the debt-equity distinction is mainly
relevant when the investors are not subject to United States tax-
meaning when they are foreigners or tax-exempt entities.149 In this
scenario the interest payments made by the corporation reduce their
United States tax liability, but those same interest payments that
would be subject to tax if they were paid to a United States person
are exempt (or otherwise very lightly taxed) because they are paid to
a party that is not subject to United States tax. Accordingly, it seems
as though the IRS should not be worried about thin corporate
capitalization 5 ' per se but should be primarily concerned with debt
investment in thinly capitalized companies by foreigners and, to a
lesser extent, by tax-exempt institutions or low-income taxpayers, a
practice which in the United States is called earnings-stripping. 5 '
Policy makers therefore have to ask whether the debt-equity
distinction is the best way to deal with earnings-stripping or whether
there are other, more direct, ways to deal with that problem.
15 2
149. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
150. The term "thin capitalization" refers to corporations that have a very high debt-
equity ratio.
151. Individuals subject to low federal tax rates and tax-exempt institutions enjoy this
status because of a conscious policy decision. The former pay low income taxes because
they are assumed to have a lower ability to pay the income tax. The tax exemption of
charitable institutions is typically justified by the theory that they supply otherwise
underprovided public goods. See generally Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of
Charitable Deductions, 84 IND. L.J. 1047 (2009) (discussing and criticizing the theory that
the tax subsidy for charities is justified on the account that they provide otherwise
undersupplied public goods). It is important to note, however, that if the marginal
corporate tax rate is higher than the income tax rate of individuals, the overall transaction
will result in a revenue loss to the Treasury. For example, if a corporation is subject to a
marginal tax rate of 35%, and it gets to deduct $100 due to interest payments, the interest
deduction saved it $35 in taxes. If that $100 is paid to an individual subject to a 15% tax
rate or to a tax-exempt institution subject to 0% rate, the overall transaction would result
in a $20 or $35 loss to the Treasury. While this is a genuine problem, it is important to
recognize that at its core it is not associated with the debt-equity distinction and the ability
to deduct interest payments, but rather with the progressive tax system. In a progressive
tax rates structure, taxpayers subject to high marginal rates will be able to deduct certain
payments even if they make them to low-tax individuals who are taxed on the gains at
lower rates. As long as these payments are not part of an income-shifting scheme (e.g.,
between family members), this is not abusive because the payments represent a real cost
to the payer, and the low income tax imposed on the payee reflects its low ability to pay
the tax.
152. In previous articles, I have argued for some policy solutions to the earnings-
stripping problem. See Ilan Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational
Enterprises by Employing a Hybrid Formulary and Arm's Length Allocation Method, 28
VA. TAX REV. 619,632-45 (2009) [hereinafter Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income of
Multinational Enterprises] (offering a proposal for how multinational enterprises' financial
income should be allocated); Benshalom, supra note 2, at 193-95 (exploring the difficulties
associated with taxing multinational enterprises' financial income); Benshalom, supra note
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However, one does not have to accept my solutions to conclude that
using the debt-equity distinction as a last line of defense to problems
of earnings-stripping seems to be an over-inclusive and costly
alternative to dealing with this problem. If the problem of earnings-
stripping is addressed directly,153 policy makers would still be required
to distinguish between debt and equity investments but may be more
flexible in doing so given that the tax revenue stakes of this
determination would not be so high.
If the tax revenue loss associated with the debt-equity distinction
could be better addressed by other means that directly deal with the
problem of earnings-stripping, the main policy objective should be to
deal with the remaining problems of compliance, uncertainty, and
efficiency costs.154 To deal with these problems, it is important to
clarify the potential political constraints in which this analysis
operates. First, even if it makes no sense, some instruments, such as
common stock, would be classified as equity, and others, such as
short-term coupon-yielding bonds, as debt. Second, the tax treatment
of those categories would be different. Third, financial engineering
would allow tax planners to create a lot of in-between hybrid
instruments.
These three assumptions suggest that to reduce compliance and
efficiency costs we first need to establish which easy-to-observe and
difficult-to-manipulate criteria would help us make the distinction.
These criteria would be arbitrary because the debt-equity distinction
is arbitrary. Nevertheless, they would have to be in line with what
debt and equity instruments actually are. For example, although we
can say, theoretically, that every financial instrument contract written
on a white piece of paper is debt and every contract written on a
yellow paper is stock, this position would be politically implausible.
49, at 674-700 (providing a theoretical analysis of the earnings-stripping problem and a
critique of the anti-earnings-stripping arrangements adopted by the Code; this article also
provides an analysis of why other mechanisms designed to tax interest income, including
withholding taxes and limitation of treaty benefits clauses, are inadequate to tax interest
income).'
153. Earnings-stripping could be dealt with directly by eliminating or amending the
portfolio interest income withholding tax exemption and by reducing the ability of foreign
multinational enterprises ("MNEs") to engage in disproportionally leveraged foreign
direct investments ("FDIs") in the United States. See Benshalom, Taxing the Financial
Income of Multinational Enterprises, supra note 152, at 632-36 (offering a solution for
disproportional leverage by MNEs); Benshalom, supra note 49, at 667-70 (explaining the
problem of the portfolio interest income withholding tax exemption).
154. Christensen, supra note 22, at 1311-18 (suggesting that the compliance costs
associated with the debt-equity distinction impose significant compliance and tax-
administration costs on taxpayers, the IRS, and the courts).
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Accordingly, the distinction we need to develop has to be observable
and has to correspond with what the general public and their elected
representatives perceive debt and equity to be. Out of the various
criteria mentioned by the doctrine, two factors-voting power and
duration-stand out as easily observable and intuitively correct
indicators of equity investment.
Voting power is one of the only characteristics that cannot be
hybridized by financial engineering. Purchasing it indicates the
willingness of the investor to spend money to buy the opportunity to
benefit from control of the corporation. This can be either a direct
benefit, which a large institutional investor may seek, or it can be an
indirect benefit-e.g., the ability to get compensated for selling the
voting power in a takeover scenario-which even small portfolio
investors may seek. In a world where corporations can issue hybrid
debt-equity instruments, and investors can purchase synthetic debt
and equity positions by buying different debt-equity and option
combinations, most of the attention about financial engineering has
naturally focused on the cash flow equivalence of certain positions.
15
Voting power, however, is something that has not been bifurcated
and typically cannot be bought separately-meaning from a party
other than the issuing corporation. In fact, it is the only attribute that
financial engineering cannot really manipulate, that only the issuing
company can sell, and which suggests a deeper potential involvement
in the corporation.156
Put differently, investors wishing to enjoy the benefits associated
with voting power have little alternative to buying common stocks or
instruments with an embedded option of purchasing common stocks.
Hence, these investors are in a very different position, and, therefore,
should be far less tax-sensitive, when compared to the majority of
investors, which are portfolio investors interested solely in risk-cash
flow positions. Unlike investors who are interested in controlling the
corporation's activities, portfolio investors can seek this position
through different hybrid instruments and synthetic positions, which
155. See, e.g., Schenk, supra note 2, at 574 (raising the issue of cash flow equivalence in
the context of equity derivatives); Strnad, supra note 2, at 573 (discussing cash flow
equivalence for innovative financial products).
156. This, of course, is subject to change. Since corporate law is developed by states,
there is a long tradition of states "engineering" corporate law investment structures that
offer investors a (federal) tax advantage. The best example for this is Wyoming's
development of the LLC-a limited liability company that for tax purposes is treated as a
partnership. Hence, it is not inconceivable that a similar dynamic will develop with regard
to voting rights if this Article's proposal is adopted.
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may be functionally different but are almost economically identical in
terms of cash flow.
Duration of a financial contract is also an important factor. It is
impossible to accurately project the long-term creditworthiness of a
corporate issuer. Accordingly, investors purchasing an unsecured
debt instrument with a forty-year maturity date are tying their return
to the corporation's business performance and are taking part of the
risk typically associated with holding equity. Time, more than
anything else, is a continuum, and there is no specific point where a
debt instrument starts bearing the equity risk.'57 Given that it is all a
matter of degree, any distinction would be arbitrary. Nevertheless,
the timeline dividing debt and equity should be clear and be
determined with reference to the policies the rules seek to promote.'58
For example, an attempt to reduce the bankruptcy risk associated
with corporations' need to refinance their activities by rolling short-
term debt may dictate that only very long-term debt instruments
would be considered as equity.
To make the debt-equity distinction easier to administer, the
definition of equity should include all instruments with embedded
options that grant the investor the option to convert its assets into
vote-holding instruments'59 and those instruments embedded with
options (to either the investor or the issuer) for extending the time
frame of the instrument. This is a somewhat crude rule, but it is
necessary given that the IRS lacks a solid doctrinal or theoretical
background to efficiently determine the validity of a convertible
instrument. Moreover, the IRS has limited resources to commit to
this costly, case-by-case enforcement endeavor.
Two examples may help clarify how this new debt-equity
classification would work. In these examples, the duration period
after which an instrument would be considered as equity would be ten
years. Assume a corporation issues two-year bonds, which could be
converted into non-voting preferred shares. The bonds carry no
voting rights and would not do so even if their conversion option is
exercised. However, even though the debt instrument is only issued
for two years, the conversion element would provide the investors
157. Even the most short-term equity contract bears the risk of counterparty default,
which essentially means that the creditor takes over the equity rights of the borrower's
assets.
158. One option is to determine this clear line with reference to David Weisbach's
optimal line-drawing theory. See infra notes 186-200 and accompanying text.
159. This means that cash-settled derivative positions would not be considered as
equity.
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with preferred shares, which have no maturity date until the
corporation agrees to redeem them or chooses to liquidate.
Accordingly, these convertible bonds should be characterized as
equity investments and their proceeds should be classified as
dividends.
Assume another scenario, in which the corporation issues a
collateralized interest paying forward. According to the contract,
investors would be required to buy stock of the corporation for a
predetermined price five years from the day of the issuance. Forwards
are pure financial bets and do not typically pay any proceeds until the
date when the future transaction is executed. In this case, however,
the issuing corporation conditions the sale of the forward on the
payment of collateral. Investors are therefore required to secure the
future payment for the forward contract with money paid on the day
of the issuance to the issuing corporation. Since the corporation
would be able to use the cash in the meantime, it would have to
compensate the investors for the time value of their money and for
bearing its own credit risk of default."6 The question would be
whether those payments should be regarded as interest payments.
The main issue is that the payments coming out of the collateral and
the forward contract are not independent instruments, because the
collateral would not have been paid absent the forward. The forward
contract to buy the corporate stock is in a sense an obligation to buy a
voting common-share with an indefinite duration period. The future
contract and its collateral are therefore equity, and the payments
produced by the collateral should be classified as dividends.
There may be some other indicators that investors in nominal
debt instruments are taking part of the equity risk-e.g., high interest
rates such as in the case of junk bonds16' and payments that are
contingent on the company's performance. 62 I am not arguing that
160. This could be done through actual periodic cash payments or it could be done
through deemed payments. The investors would take into account whether the collateral
yields any cash payments and would discount the amount they are willing to put as
collateral if the instrument would not provide them with such cash payments.
161. The term "junk bonds" refers to bonds issued by high-risk firms that pay a high
rate of interest, which compensates investors for the high risk of default.
162. For such examples, see Hariton, supra note 74, at 522 (arguing that determining
the character of a position by the risk associated with it is difficult since an entity such as a
utility could issue equity that is "less risky than the senior debt of a venture corporation");
Hariton, supra note 71, at 771 (describing what he calls the modern approach as the
approach advocated by the Treasury regulations issued, and later withdrawn, under I.R.C.
§ 385 (2006), which treats a payment as a return on equity if its amount varies with factors
relating to the issuer's business); Schlunk, supra note 124, at 887-90; David V. Ceryak,
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these indicators should be disregarded altogether, but only that the
prime indicators of the debt-equity character should be based on
either voting power or duration. Other considerations relate to the
measurement of risk and may be dynamic and more costly to observe.
For example, the actual way in which an instrument insulates the
investor from the risks associated with the issuer's success would
depend on the capital structure of the issuer and the overall nature of
its business. It is impossible to weigh each of those considerations,
and they are subject to change over time. These risk-related
considerations should therefore be taken into account only as part of
supplementary anti-abuse rules.163 These anti-abuse rules are
necessary so that taxpayers and the IRS could classify the character of
the vast majority of instruments with a relatively high level of
confidence, while giving the IRS a tool to counter cases of evident
abuse.
To be clear, in the current state of affairs, when no effective
remedy to the earnings-stripping problem has yet been adopted, the
debt-equity distinction of instruments traded on public markets
should not primarily depend on their duration and on whether they
assign voting power. Adopting this Article's proposal today, when
there is no adequate mechanism to deal with problems of earnings-
stripping, would result in a huge, inequitable revenue loss. 164
However, it is important first to recognize that the assumption that
the debt-equity distinction is immutable does not entail that other
arrangements-such as the earnings-stripping regime-cannot be
reformed. The distinction between debt and equity is an inherent part
of the double corporate tax regime, which is a delicate status quo that
involves many taxpayers with conflicting interests and lobbying
powers. 65 In contrast, the earnings-stripping problem involves
primarily foreign investors, so that reforming it may generate
considerably less political opposition than an overall corporate tax
reform.
Note, Using Risk Analysis to Classify Junk Bonds as Equity for Federal Income Tax
Purposes, 66 IND. L.J. 273, 283-84 (1990).
163. These rules should prevent abusive "mixed deals" where shareholders are
simultaneously issued pro-rata debt and equity instruments that are proportional to their
holding in the corporation. While mixed deals are not abusive per se, taxpayers may
construct sophisticated contractual mechanisms that effectively prevent investors from
selling their debt and equity instruments separately. A general anti-abuse rule would be
necessary to prevent this type of planning.
164. See I.R.C. § 1630); see also Benshalom, supra note 49, at 686-700 (describing and
criticizing the current earnings-stripping arrangement).
165. See Arlen & Weiss, supra note 3, at 328-35.
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The core of the challenge is to best reconcile the need to make a
distinction between debt and equity with the notion of financial
equivalence of different positions. Much of the compliance costs,
pricing disorders, and avoidance opportunities we face today emerge
from the attempt of the current rules to defy the notion of financial
equivalence. This Article offers an alternative approach, which calls
for recognizing the capacity of financial engineering to attain financial
equivalence by using different instruments that are taxed differently
and to try to deal with it to the extent that we can do so reasonably.
Some commentators have expressed skepticism about taxpayers'
actual ability to use financial innovations to substantially avoid or
reduce their taxes.1" Simple tax-avoidance transactions that work in
theory do not necessarily work in practice. 67 The low availability of
certain instruments (e.g., long-term options), the difficulty in
mimicking issuers' credit risk (especially in light of the current crisis
in the credit default swap markets), and the tendency of tax
authorities to act quickly to tackle certain abusive transactions that
allow such reductions,'68 all make it difficult for taxpayers to generate
perfect substitutes to traditional debt-equity positions. This criticism
may be true, and, especially in times of financial crises where
taxpayers' readiness to experiment is low and when they already have
plenty of losses to offset their gains, it may be difficult to see how
financial innovations could be flexibly utilized to avoid taxes. It is,
however, reasonable to assume that over time technology would
reduce transaction costs and make financial innovation available to a
wider range of taxpayers. If there is money to be made, markets will
develop to increase the availability of tax-favored positions that can
substitute more traditional debt-equity positions.
To deal with the long-term implications of financial-engineered
substitution, policy makers should try to think about which easy-to-
observe attributes are difficult to substitute via financial innovation
and try to make the debt-equity distinction primarily dependent upon
them. Accordingly, even if one doubts whether the debt-equity
distinction and other difficulties in taxing financial instruments
significantly erode the income and corporate tax bases today, one
should be prepared to admit that technology may make this problem
more significant in the future. Hence, it is appropriate to adopt this
166. Gergen, supra note 19, at 841-44; Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 1332-33; Weisbach,
supra note 32, at 908.
167. Gergen, supra note 19, at 841-44; Kleinbard, supra note 2, at 1332-33; Weisbach,
supra note 32, at 908.
168. For example, see I.R.C. §§ 1091, 1092.
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Article's proposal, which identifies those difficult-to-manipulate
attributes of financial instruments.
The Article does not aim to offer a panacea solution to the debt-
equity distinction. As with any criteria set forward to try and
consistently classify financial instruments in a non-ideal reality, the
voting and duration criteria could be manipulated and avoided
through tax-driven financial engineering. 16 9 While there are basically
infinite avoidance opportunities, it is important to bear in mind two
key notions when evaluating this Article's contribution. First, current
tax law provides tax policy makers with some legal tools to confront
this type of planning. 7 ' The intellectual foundations of these tools are
not always rigorous, and they are very difficult to enforce
comprehensively. 7' Nevertheless, despite these difficulties, tax
authorities have developed ways to partially deal with these tax
avoidance problems.7 2 Second, one has to remember that, even
though the ability to manipulate this Article's proposal raises
concerns, the relevant point of reference for evaluating it is by
comparing it to the rules currently governing the debt-equity
distinction and to other non-ideal alternatives. As detailed in the
following Part, my aim is not to provide a flawless solution in an ideal
reality, but rather to offer an expedient and practical alternative in a
reality in which current tax law arrangements do not seem to operate
169. For example, investors seeking equity classification can insist on having an
embedded legal option in the instrument, which is legally valid but economically worthless
(because it is "out of the money"). Alternatively, investors seeking debt classification can
break a loan instrument into separate instruments to avoid the need for a duration
extension option or to avoid having voting rights taint their entire investment as equity.
170. See generally Jeff Strnad, Commentary, Taxing New Financial Products in a
Second-Best World: Bifurcation and Integration, 50 TAX L. REV. 545, 548 (1995)
(describing a variety of approaches to taxing financial instruments); Weisbach, supra note
25 (advocating bifurcation as the best theoretical approach to taxing financial
instruments).
171. See Strnad, supra note 170, at 548; Weisbach, supra note 25, at 492-95.
172. When there are concerns for tax avoidance, tax authorities can determine the
"correct" tax result by a variety of methods. First, tax authorities can disregard worthless
options. See Rev. Rul. 2003-97, 2003-2 C.B. 380 ("[I]f the characterization of an instrument
or a transaction for federal income tax purposes either depends on, or could be affected
by, the existence of a person's legal right or option to elect a certain course of action, the
tax consequences often depend on whether the exercise (or nonexercise) of the right or
option is economically compelled based on all the facts and circumstances."). Second, tax
authorities can separate single hybrid positions into different positions. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.446-3(f) (as amended in 1994) (explaining how notional principal amount
arrangements, also known as swaps, could be bifurcated so that non-periodic payments
and deemed non-periodic payments would be recognized in an appropriate manner).
Lastly, tax authorities can integrate different instruments into a single position. See I.R.C.
§§ 1091, 1092, 1258, 1259.
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properly and in which there is no foreseeable political support for an
overall reform of the corporate tax system. This Article's proposal
provides a better solution-a solution that is clearer, more difficult to
manipulate, and that results in less economic distortions.
In conclusion, policy makers need to first determine what
functions the rules were meant to serve, what functions they currently
fulfill, and what policy objectives they can reasonably achieve. The
debt-equity distinction may be an immutable characteristic of our
current tax system, but it does not follow that we need to charge it
with achieving functions which may have been relevant thirty years
ago but are now completely obsolete. Moreover, even though there
may not be a good reason why tax law should distinguish the tax
treatment of debt and equity, once tax rules contain this distinction,
tax policy makers cannot disregard the revenue and huge efficiency
stakes (manifested in the current economic crises) associated with the
inadequacy of the debt-equity distinction. In terms of revenue, the
real issue at stake involves only the category of hybrid debt
instruments issued by public corporations, which are held by investors
that are not subject to United States income tax. Once this is
recognized, we can see that making the debt-equity distinction for
many other instruments could be greatly simplified.
IV. THE DEBT-EQUITY DISTINCTION AND THE LINE-DRAWING
PROBLEM
This Part explains some of the recent academic interest in the
debt-equity classification. As demonstrated through the debt-equity
example, tax doctrine can be messy and almost anti-intellectual
because courts' reliance on lists of factors and their reluctance to
prioritize them renders much of the doctrinal inquiry a "smell-test"
rather than an analytical inquiry.'73 Not surprisingly, for many years
academics have been unwilling to confront this issue." 4
Tax academics' recent writing on this topic came not because
they recognized that there is a better solution, rather it came as part
of the recognition that the problem is so deeply rooted in the federal
173. Another example of this type of inquiry is the "substance over form" doctrine first
adopted in Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 364-66 (1960).
174. Weisbach, supra note 18, at 1627 (claiming that since the William Plumb summary
of the case law in 1971, no academic article has addressed the subject). See generally
William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical
Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAx L. REV. 369 (1971) (summarizing the law at the time with
respect to the debt-equity distinction).
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tax system that (politically) it is almost beyond solving.'75 This
recognition teased out an interesting policy inquiry of how tax policy
makers should best "draw the line" between debt and equity
instruments when the notion of different treatment is disconnected
from the underlying economic reality.
This Part draws on this literature to situate the inquiry about the
debt-equity distinction within a broader theoretical context. It first
explains the line-drawing problem and the highly theorized optimal
line-drawing approach that is represented by David Weisbach's work.
This Article then compares, contrasts, and evaluates its own approach
with the approach of the optimal line-drawing theory.
A. The Line-Drawing Problem
Tax law relies on legal fictions to operate. 76 Indeed, in many
ways the teaching and studying of tax law is a process to indoctrinate
new potential members into a professional community that accepts
the validity of those fictions.' Unavoidable as these fictitious
classifications are, the frictions they create impose enormous costs on
both tax authorities and taxpayers. Taxpayers are likely to take
actions to seek tax arbitrage by switching from one classification to
another-especially when switching is inexpensive and the body of
law regulating it is unclear and inconsistent-so that the tax savings
are potentially very high.'78 Such manipulation obviously erodes the
tax base and inequitably allocates the tax burden. 179 Hence, tax
authorities would be inclined to develop anti-avoidance rules to try
and prevent it. These rules tend to be complex and to involve high
administrative, compliance, and litigation costs. 80 The non-viability of
the doctrinal distinctions and general anti-avoidance rules, along with
their substantial enforcement costs, suggest the proper endeavor is to
175. For examples of other articles that try to provide a theoretical analysis in a
constrained reality in the context of the income tax treatment of financial instruments, see
generally Schenk, supra note 2 (arguing for a partial integration approach); Schizer, supra
note 59 (exploring the tax attributes of convertible preferred stock).
176. Such fictions include the distinctions between capital assets and ordinary assets,
taxable transactions and tax-free reorganizations, and corporations and partnerships. See
I.R.C. §§ 351,368, 1001, 1221; Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2, -3 (as amended in 2008).
177. See Rosenbloom, supra note 138, at 20-22.
178. Strnad, supra note 2, at 573.
179. See Weisbach, supra note 59, at 222-25 (making the even stronger claim that tax
planning is inefficient from a macro-social perspective and should be viewed as a negative
externality of some taxpayers imposing extra costs on others).
180. See I.R.C. §§ 1091-1092 (dealing with this problem-the wash-sale and straddle
rules-which impose a lot of penalties and require a great amount of monitoring that is
unrealistic in the case of taxpayers with complicated portfolios).
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attempt to reduce the costs and distortions associated with these
frictions instead of trying to eliminate them altogether.
To be precise, while it is hard to think of a fictions- and frictions-
free tax system, many of the fictions currently embedded in our
income tax system are wasteful and unnecessary-they could be
significantly reduced by a better-designed system. However, those
fictions also involve many tradeoffs, so that changing them can alter
the status quo significantly-inevitably resulting in many potential
winners and losers.181 Even if there is broad agreement that a certain
fiction is harmful, these types of changes require legislative reform
that could be generated only if backed by a strong political will.Y The
attempt to find real-world solutions does not endorse the frictions in
the Code but recognizes the need to develop solutions that would
minimize those frictions in the absence of a major legislative
reform.183 Hence, this type of inquiry assumes an imperfect tax system
with some embedded fictions and frictions that are politically
immutable.1" Put differently, the line-drawing inquiry recognizes that
a certain distinction may be economically arbitrary and that every
line-drawing criterion would have to be arbitrary as well. However, it
also recognizes that, despite the inherent arbitrariness of the criteria
set forward, it is policy makers' obligation to make the distinction in a
way that reduces the associated social costs to the extent possible.
There is of course a tension between "good" tax policy and
"good" line-drawing policy because the former seeks to promote a tax
system with fewer problems while the latter only seeks to reduce the
various symptoms of those problems. Accordingly, "good line-
drawing" reduces the pressure on legislators to eliminate arbitrary
distinctions in the Code. This line of objection does not directly
confront the need for a better line-drawing agenda. It merely suggests
that there may be considerable disagreement about whether a specific
distinction should be viewed from a practical perspective as being
politically immutable. However, if it is clear that the elimination of
certain arbitrary tax distinctions is not going to be part of any tax
reform agenda in the foreseeable future, then it is tax policy makers'
181. See generally Arlen & Weiss, supra note 3 (explaining why, as a matter of political
economy, corporate managers benefit from the double tax on dividends).
182. See David A. Weisbach, An Efficiency Analysis of Line-Drawing in the Tax Law,
29 J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 73 (2000) (arguing that even the most significant major tax reform
in the last three decades-the 1986 Tax Reform Act-only shifted the lines between
different classifications rather than eliminated some of the harmful distinctions).
183. For examples of articles that try to find policy solutions in a second-best reality
scenario, see Schenk, supra note 2, at 579-90; Strnad, supra note 170, at 553-69.
184. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 182, at 74-75.
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responsibility to find ways to reduce the social costs associated with
the distinction, until it is eventually reformed.
B. The Optimal Line-Drawing Approach
Arbitrary distinctions, such as the debt-equity distinction, have
little if any justification for why they should be enforced but for the
fact that they are "in the Code." With this type of shaky why, it is no
wonder that practitioners devote most of their time to questions of
how, while academics find it more attractive to solve abstract
problems with intellectually "cleaner" solutions. For the most part,
thoughtful scholarly works prefer to develop general models based on
simplified assumptions. 185 The strength of these models is also the
source of their weakness, however. They rely on simplified
assumptions that provide meaningful intellectual insights but often
cannot help policy makers resolve actual line-drawing problems
because they do not take into account nuanced features of the
problems they need to resolve. This Article demonstrates that, by
themselves, these models offer little guidance to policy makers.
Furthermore, this Article suggests that if these models were to be
made a more effective tool, they would have to be supplemented in a
way that would allow them to take account of the real-world
constraints in which they operate.
This Article addresses the optimal line-drawing theory as it is
represented in two leading articles written by David Weisbach. 186 It
focuses on the optimal line-drawing theory because it is the most
persuasive and comprehensive theoretical approach that ties the
debt-equity distinction to the more general problem of line-drawing
and because it represents a broader realm of law and economic
literature which highlights the importance of efficiency considerations
within tax law. Those articles stipulate that certain tax classifications
are, or at least should (for all practical purposes) be, perceived as
fixed-even when there is no clear justification for the different tax
treatments and the distortions associated with them.'87 Such politically
fixed distinctions require policy makers to draw a line on a
continuous range of transactions between these fixed points to
determine the tax treatment of a specific transaction. Taxpayers, in
185. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 18, at 1649-79.
186. See generally Weisbach, supra note 182 (providing a model for efficient line-
drawing that suggests that an item should be taxed like its closest substitute); Weisbach,
supra note 18 (arguing that tax line-drawing should be based on the efficiency of
competing rules rather than on doctrine or efficiency).
187. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 18, at 1640.
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turn, observe this line-drawing and may alter their behavior when the
costs associated with the change are smaller than its perceived tax
advantages.
188
Through reference to the optimal commodity taxation literature,
Weisbach advocates and models a solution that is broad, clear, and
intuitively appealing. 9 This solution relates to those cases in which
tax policy makers are constrained by difficult-to-change legislation to
classify a new transaction according to two (or more) immutable and
mutually exclusive categories that carry different tax consequences.
Given the inevitability of the inefficiencies and inequities associated
with the frictions between the immutable categories, tax policy
makers are left with the obligation to minimize the damage. In this
case, where no middle path is available, policy makers should first
determine through positive empirical research which of the existing
categories the new transaction more closely resembles. Put
differently, they should determine whether the new transaction
substitutes one category more than another. 9 After this has been
determined, they should tax the transaction like its closest substitute.
This would minimize the distortions associated with the "substitution
effect," which is a change in taxpayers' behavior motivated by a tax-
driven price change.'91 By taxing the new type of transaction as its
closest substitute, tax policy makers would minimize the number of
taxpayers that change their behavior to seek the result of a particular
tax classification.
1 92
The lucidity of this solution and its broad applicability are
impressive. Weisbach is, however, careful to constrain his proposal.
First, he observes that policy makers should avoid providing a
disadvantageous tax treatment to high-elasticity transactions.
193
188. Id. at 1631.
189. See Weisbach, supra note 182, at 75; Weisbach, supra note 18, at 1631.
190. See discussion of MIPs infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
191. See LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 87-
90(2008).
192. Weisbach acknowledges that doctrinal analysis could be viewed as an attempt to
make such determinations in the absence of adequate empirical information but expresses
skepticism about the likelihood that doctrinal criteria offer a good measure for
substitution. See Weisbach, supra note 182, at 92.
193. These transactions are transactions in which a small increase in price may result in
a huge decline in demand. Accordingly, if, as a result of the tax, these transactions are
taxed too heavily, the demand for them may drop sharply and may result in a huge welfare
(dead-weight) loss and a huge revenue loss. To avoid this, Weisbach concludes that "we
should tax the transaction like its closest substitute (to take into account the substitution
costs), but should not tax the high-elasticity transaction too much (to take into account the
direct costs)." Weisbach, supra note 18, at 1663.
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Second, he is aware that to fully evaluate his proposal one should
take into account its revenue and distributional effects.194 Third, he
argues that tax policy makers should take into account the costs of
taxpayers' attempts to avoid the rules.'95  Finally, and most
importantly for the purposes of this paper, Weisbach acknowledges
that determining the starting point for reform is very difficult.
19 6
Especially in the financial world, identifying the "true" prototypes of
transactions may be difficult given the fungible nature of capital
resources, the highly responsive industry of financial innovations, and
the impact of taxes on the design of these instruments."9 Even though
Weisbach fully realizes the importance of determining the core
immutable points of tax reform, he addresses this issue only in an
abstract and partial manner.
198
Weisbach uses two examples to contextualize his optimal line-
drawing analysis: the tax distinction between business entities subject
to a separate corporate tax and the debt-equity distinction. With
regard to the debt-equity distinction, he notes that "[d]ebt and equity
are fundamentally similar methods of financing a business yet are
treated differently for tax purposes '"199 and concludes that "we should
tax a security like its closest substitute, but should be a little more
194. If a new transaction is taxed like its closest substitute and, as a result, the tax base
is eroded, in order to compensate for this revenue loss, the government would have to
raise other taxes. Id. at 1665. The efficiency gain associated with the attempt to reduce the
substitution effect should be weighed against the inefficiencies associated with the taxes
levied to compensate for the revenue loss. See id. In the same manner, if policy makers
wish to attain a certain distributional outcome, they should take into account efficiency
costs associated with the additional taxes and subsidies necessary to attain this
distributional outcome. Id.; see also Schlunk, supra note 124, at 882-83 (implicitly
criticizing Weisbach's theory on this point by arguing that courts apply a methodology that
is akin to the one advocated by Weisbach and the optimal-commodity-tax literature of
finding the closest substitute).
195. A complete assessment of efficiency considerations requires assessing all the costs
incurred by private parties. These costs are inefficient from a macro-social perspective and
should be weighed against the potential efficiency gains of drawing the line in one place
rather than the other. Weisbach, supra note 18, at 1669-72 (explaining that this problem
may occur in low-elasticity transactions where a tax-driven change in price will motivate
only a few taxpayers to seek substitutions but for which there are substantial social costs
for every taxpayer that shifts his behavior).
196. Id. at 1669.
197. Id.
198. Id. (providing that rather than looking at the form of a transaction, policy makers
should try to determine whether taxes distort the ability of taxpayers to attain their
desired risk and return).
199. Weisbach, supra note 32, at 893.
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generous for debt than for equity [because the demand for equity is
more elastic and sensitive to tax costs].
' 200
The policy justifications for taxing corporations as separate
entities are shaky.20' As a result, it is difficult to determine how
normative arguments can contribute to the analysis of real-world
problems.2 12 The optimal line-drawing theory, which highlights the
value of efficiency considerations, offers such normative guidance in a
setting in which normative considerations seem to play little (if any)
role.203 However, the assertion that we should rely on empirical
research to determine whether hybrid financial instruments should be
classified as debt or equity falls short of providing a meaningful
solution to the problem.' 4 On the practical level, it seems unhelpful
to suggest that policy makers should rely on empirical research to
resolve a problem so frequently litigated.0 5 Financial innovation does
not require deploying assets or special technological advancement so
200. Weisbach, supra note 18, at 1663. For many, this conclusion may seem surprising
given Weisbach's strong, long-standing objection to the separate corporate income tax,
which he regards to be an inefficient and inequitable fiscal instrument. Id. at 1637-38. One
would think that given his firm position against the corporate tax, Weisbach would be in
favor of broadening the classification of debt without any limits, which would erode the
corporate tax base. However, in the context of a second-best reality, in which the separate
corporate income tax exists, Weisbach argues that treating hybrid instruments that are
better substitutes to equity as debt would have devastating consequences. Weisbach, supra
note 182, at 80. Equity investors would start investing in those new hybrids, and this would
"increase... the costs of financial distress and the reduction in tax revenues." Id.
201. See discussion supra note 3.
202. See generally Saul Levmore, Recharacterizations and the Nature of Theory in
Corporate Tax Law, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1019, 1061-65 (1988) ("Positive theories and
normative values are sometimes fairly separable. This is especially, or even uniquely, true
in corporate tax law where rules and decisions are almost necessarily devoid of a
normative foundation and are especially arbitrary. Corporate tax law is arbitrary because,
like most of American tax law, it requires a specific recognition event before it taxes
appreciation in asset values and because it regards corporations as taxable entities that are
distinct from their shareholders. These features are best labeled arbitrary, rather than
unfair or inefficient, because it is not entirely clear that alternative rules would be any
more efficient or fair. The point is not to 'defend' the fundamental rules of the tax system
as merely arbitrary, but rather to note that because these rules are arbitrary, it is virtually
impossible to develop normative arguments about questions that arise as a result or in the
shadow of these basic starting points. The nature of corporate tax law often defies
normative argumentation.").
203. Most importantly, Weisbach's analysis provides an interesting and persuasive
argument about how to reconcile efficiency objectives with revenue and distributional
concerns in a constrained reality.
204. See supra notes 183-92 and accompanying text.
205. See generally Christensen, supra note 22 (analyzing, in light of longstanding and
frequent litigation on the issue, the circuit courts of appeals' continued split over the
proper standard of review of a trial court's determination of debt or equity status).
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new instruments can be issued with little cost.2°6 Given the low cost of
generating innovative financial instruments, it would be costly (in
terms of time and resources) for taxpayers and tax authorities to
provide reliable empirical data so that courts can assess the character
of those instruments. The solution is rendered even more impractical
given courts' questionable expertise in assessing complicated
empirical data and economic research.
The optimal line-drawing theory is also problematic because, as
any analysis that deals with second-best solutions, it has to commence
with a conscious filtering process that determines which parts of
reality it embraces and which it wishes to challenge. This process
requires deciding what the acceptable limits of practical political
considerations are and designating them as the boundaries of the
analysis. Because these boundaries depend on dynamic human
practices, there is a genuine difficulty of determining the starting
point, and any determination is inherently contestable. As a second-
best theory, determining the boundaries is the Archimedean point on
which the optimal line-drawing theory relies.27 Nevertheless, this
issue is not addressed at all in the optimal line-drawing theory
analysis. Accordingly, to offer a viable vehicle to address real-world
problems, the line-drawing theory should be refined, or rather
supplemented, with a starting point that would help policy makers
identify the fixed points that they should compare.
The best illustration of why the line-drawing theory is insufficient
as a stand-alone theory is provided in its discussion of the debt-equity
distinction and the presentation of the Monthly Income Preferred
Stocks ("MIPS") case study.20 8 MIPS were designed as instruments
that would qualify as debt for tax purposes but would count as equity
for other purposes-most importantly for financial accounting,2 9
credit rating, and (bank) capital adequacy regulatory purposes.210
206. See Schlunk, supra note 124, at 861-62.
207. For those readers unfamiliar with the concept, an "Archimedean point" is a
theoretical position from which one can objectively analyze the totality of the subject
under observation. See Michael Shermer, The Really Hard Science, SCI. AM., Oct. 2007, at
44, 46, available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=the-really-hard-
science&ref=rss.
208. See Weisbach, supra note 18, at 1673-74.
209. In May 2003, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards No. 150, which limited the ability to treat MIPS as equity
for financial accounting purposes. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 150 app. A, at A4, A5 (2003).
210. See Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 2, at 141; Weisbach, supra note 182, at 79;
Weisbach, supra note 18, at 1673; Robert Willens, Are 'Maximum Contingent' Instruments
Debt?, 112 TAX NOTES 607, 607 (2006). MIPS were essentially long-term debt instruments
[Vol. 881266
2010] HOW TO LIVE WITH A TAX CODE 1267
MIPS were an almost perfect substitute for preferred stock, which is
considered equity for tax purposes, and their (tax) characterization as
debt essentially eliminated the issuance of non-MIPS preferred stock
(which were considered equity for tax purposes). According to the
optimal line-drawing theory, the IRS should have classified MIPS as
equity for tax purposes. When it instead did not challenge the
classification of MIPS as debt, this classification resulted in a shift of
investors from preferred stock to MIPS-a shift that led to revenue
loss and an increase in their exposure to bankruptcy risk."'1
Posing the question of whether MIPS are better substitutes for
publicly issued preferred stocks or for publicly issued bonds
overlooks that, given the changes in corporate investment practices
over the last half century, preferred stocks in publicly owned
companies may not be fundamentally different from certain
unsubordinated long-term bond investments, so that the optimal line-
drawing theory's basic point for comparison may not be valid.212 This
(typically issued for a period of more than ten years). They were "equity-flavored"
because they were subordinated to the claims of all other creditors, and, because, even
though the payments were fixed, issuers had a unilateral ability to defer them for extended
periods, so long as no dividend payments were made. Weisbach, supra note 182, at 79.
211. See Weisbach, supra note 18, at 1673-74.
212. Preferred stock offers passive investors a fixed return from corporate profits (so
that they do not have claims over the corporation's residual profit) which can be deferred.
It provides investors with priority over equity shareholders in cases of liquidation and with
regard to dividend payments. Owners of preferred stock generally have no voting power.
The main difference between them and bondholders is that they do not have a right for
the return of the principal on a designated date, or the right to compel payment even when
the corporation has not generated any profits. In the case of long-term debt instruments,
the right to receive the principal is heavily discounted because of the vagueness of the
issuer's creditworthiness when the debt reaches maturity. For some companies, which are
either especially risky or stable in their earnings, the right to compel payments only from
profits may also not be of huge economic significance. In public companies with stable
earnings, the fact that preferred stock has priority over dividend payments is taken into
account by the secondary markets in which the instruments are traded. This means that
investors could cash out their investment at no or low discount even if they could not
compel payments. In the case of risky corporations, the right to compel payments only
from profits is not different from the positions of many creditors. For example, many risky
corporations issue "junk bonds" which are bonds that pay no coupons. Given the high risk
associated with those investments the bonds are sold for much less than face value-
meaning that their interest rate is very high. Investors buying these bonds are de facto in a
position very similar to that of equity investors because chances are that the company
would only be able to pay its debt if it is profitable. The difference between the type of
risk undertaken by preferred stock and debt holders may have been significantly different
when dealing with illiquid, closely held, private corporations, which were somewhat
opaque to non-controlling shareholders. Accordingly, the initial characterization of
preferred stock as equity made a lot of sense when made years ago. This characterization
should be questioned, however, given the dramatic changes in the corporate tax base
terrain-most importantly, that the corporate tax is now imposed almost exclusively upon
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critique does not suggest the optimal line-drawing theory is wrong.
However, it does suggest that employing a methodology that merely
compares empirical data about the substitution of two instruments is
not enough to provide an answer to the line-drawing problem because
it lacks an Archimedean point. In the same way policy makers can ask
whether MIPS are a closer substitute for debt or preferred stock, they
can ask whether preferred stock is a better substitute for stock or
debt. Furthermore, assuming that once MIPS have been classified as
debt, when tax planners engineer a new instrument that on the debt-
equity continuum lies between MIPS and preferred stock, what would
be the appropriate question to ask? Would we have to check whether
the new instrument is a better substitute for classic debt or equity?
MIPS? Preferred stock? From an analytical perspective, there is no a
priori reason to prefer one category of instruments over another.
By Weisbach's own account, 213 the optimal line-drawing theory
does not seek to address the broader real-world problem associated
with policy makers' difficulty in correcting their classifications as
circumstances change.214 However, to enable policy makers to use the
optimal line-drawing proposal to generate sensible solutions, one first
needs to provide them with a recognition rule of what should be a
sensible classification. Put differently, even if for tax purposes policy
makers should take as a given the necessity of distinguishing between
debt and equity instruments, they should not assume that every
distinction made in the past still makes sense today. Accordingly,
when they come to employ the optimal line-drawing theory to
determine whether a new instrument is a better substitute for debt or
for equity, they should first examine the premise of whether what
they are comparing could still be perceived as a relevant distinction.
public corporations. Accordingly, Weisbach's assumption that the debt-equity distinction
is immutable, and thus exogenous, combines two related yet analytically different notions.
First, he assumes that a certain group of investment assets in corporations should be
classified as either debt or equity-meaning that there is no possibility for any third
classification. Second, he seems to assume that this distinction should be based on business
norms that are more than fifty years old. While the first notion is the essence of his
second-best reality inquiry, the implications of his second notion are somewhat
overlooked.
213. Weisbach, supra note 32, at 903 (admitting that his optimal line-drawing theory is
not sensitive to problems of path dependency and decision making correction, but arguing
that this in essence is a problem of decision making in general and not unique to line-
drawing).
214. See generally Schlunk, supra note 124 (arguing that Weisbach's theory does not
account for problems of path dependency).
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C. Principles for Real-World Line-Drawing Solutions
This sub-Part extrapolates a general approach to line-drawing
from this Article's inquiry of the debt-equity distinction. The attempt
to derive more general conclusions is necessary to clarify this Article's
contribution to policy making regarding line-drawing problems. This
Article develops an approach comprised of a series of questions that
tax policy makers should ask themselves upon trying to determine
their policy regarding a specific line-drawing problem. Instead of
proposing a new theory of line-drawing, this approach tries to
meaningfully impact policy makers' decisions by identifying what
should be the matters at stake-or what should be the starting point
and framework of the analysis.
This Article takes the position that real-world problems like the
debt-equity distinction are too important to be academically ignored
because leaving them undertheorized has too many real-world costs
(in terms of revenue, efficiency, and compliance). This Article should
be seen as part of an ongoing academic attempt to examine how to
provide a more policy-oriented approach to an admittedly disarrayed
reality embedded with many non-theoretical real-world problems that
tax legislation requires us to address. This attempt may require an
undertaking most tax academics may not like-looking at individual,
technically complicated problems. However, even though every line-
drawing problem requires a specifically tailored solution, some
general conclusions can be inferred regarding how to approach those
issues. Therefore, the ambition is not to provide a clear-cut solution
to every line-drawing problem but to develop a methodology of how
line-drawing problems should be approached.
The need for this approach arises because, as the case study of
the debt-equity distinction demonstrates, traditional doctrinal
analysis has typically produced poor outcomes. Rather than helping
policy makers create more thoughtful distinctions, the old analysis
typically constrains them to a set of arbitrary tests that merely
complicate the analysis, making tax planning more expensive and
distortive. 5 Furthermore, tax doctrine rarely succeeds in providing
comprehensive rules that prevent taxpayers from exploiting
loopholes, allowing revenue leakage and the inequitable distribution
of the tax burden.
Through the debt-equity framework, I introduced how such an
inquiry should be approached. First, the cases that impose the highest
215. See discussion supra Part II.
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social costs and the relevant group of taxpayers should be identified.
In this context, policy makers should give special heed to the fact that
many of the tax conventions were determined during an era when
markets were by and large domestic and that the process of global
economic integration has opened new avenues of abuse that are
frequently overlooked.216
After determining the relevant group of taxpayers and cases, the
original purpose of the rules should be determined. This step is
important because policy makers' analysis often suffers from
unconscious path dependency-focusing on how old rules should be
enforced instead of on what reasonable outcomes they should seek to
promote. Then, with reference to the changing circumstances, a set of
plausible objectives of what the rules can achieve should be
determined. It is important to stress that there may not be any strong
connection between the original objectives and those that could
reasonably be pursued. Policy makers should be aware of this
possible friction and try to avoid the legacy of old mistakes.
Finally, the notion that some aspects of the legislative reality are
difficult to change does not mean that all related aspects of legislation
are immutable. Policy makers should therefore be careful in picking
their battles to try and promote changes in those areas which are
likely to produce maximum benefits at minimum costs. This is
important because enacting legislation to prevent avenues of abuse
that involve primarily international taxpayers may generate
considerably less opposition than those involving domestic taxpayers.
CONCLUSIONS
Academics engaging in inquiries of realistic tax law problems
cannot offer any panacea that solves all problems across the board.
Nevertheless, engaging in policy-oriented inquiries about how real-
world problems should be addressed offers the middle way, allowing
policy makers to simultaneously avoid both the tyranny of past follies
and the futility of utopian inquiries. In the context of the debt-equity
216. See, e.g., Steven A. Dean, Attractive Complexity: Tax Deregulation, the Check-the-
Box Election, and the Future of Tax Simplification, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 405, 455-56
(2005) (discussing the international implications of the check-the-box regulations);
Weisbach, supra note 18, at 1628 (supporting his proposal by providing an additional
example involving the check-the-box regulations that replaced the four-factor test that
used to govern whether an entity should be characterized as a corporation for tax
purposes-the rules resulted in an enormous simplification of the corporate tax law but
had the unintended consequences of allowing multinationals to completely avoid anti-
deferral legislation in international taxation and to substantially reduce their tax liability).
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distinction, this Article encourages tax policy makers to take a fresh
look at the potential sources of revenue loss. It claims that the
problem today is not the erosion of the corporate tax base through
thin capitalization. Instead, it argues that, in the context of public
corporations, the revenue loss problem is a result of the low effective
tax rate on debt investment of foreigners. Once policy makers
recognize that this is the main problem in terms of revenue, they may
recognize that there are ways to deal with it other than through the
debt-equity distinction. Since the revenue costs of the debt-equity
distinction in the context of individuals that are United States tax
residents are much lower, much of the complexity and distortion of
the debt-equity distinction would be eliminated if it were based on
the two difficult-to-manipulate characteristics of voting power and
duration.
This Article suggests that tax academics do not have the luxury
of neglecting issues on the grounds that they are normatively
unsettled or intellectually unclean. People who care about tax equity
cannot just wait for the system to sort itself out via a case-by-case
analysis and should not give up on creating a better system just
because a perfect one is unavailable. Instead of asking how to create a
flawless tax system, this Article emphasizes the need to make the
existing system less imperfect.
The debt-equity distinction is a concrete example of how
common sense may assist good policy-making insights, which can help
refine tax law doctrines as well as law and economic models. This
type of inquiry is especially relevant in the context of the income tax
treatment of financial instruments where the amount of frictions,
fictions, distortions, arbitrage opportunities, and compliance costs are
overwhelming. The analysis of the debt-equity distinction provided
by this Article is but a first step in that direction.
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APPENDIX A. TOP BRACKET CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL
STATUTORY TAX RATES, 1909-2012217
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217. See, e.g., TAX FOUND., TAX DATA: FEDERAL CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES,
INCOME YEARS 1909-2009 (2009), http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/show/2140.html;
TAX FOUND., TAX DATA: U.S. FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES HISTORY
1913-2009 (2009), http://www.taxfoundation.org/taxdata/show/151.html; cf OBAMA'08,
BARACK OBAMA'S COMPREHENSIVE TAX PLAN 4-6 (2008), http://www.barackobama
.com/pdf/taxes/Factsheet TaxPlanFINAL.pdf (suggesting top individual income tax
rates of 36% and 39.6%, and broadening of the corporate tax base).
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APPENDIX B. EFFECTIVE TAX RATES ON DIFFERENT CORPORATE
INVESTMENTS
After-tax returns for different corporate investments under top
marginal statutory income tax rates for individuals and corporations in










Individual Capital Gains 0.455
After-tax money for different investment strategies
1954
Corporate Debt Investment 10.46
Corporate Investment Paying Dividend 10.21







































Corporate Investment with Retention 12.96 13.15 12.96
highest return
lowest return
How much greater is the strategy yielding the highest after-tax rate of return than the strategy yielding
the lowest rate of return (%)?
1954 1979 1988 1999 2008 2010
658.41 287.594 159.105 160.5492 120 117.2
218. See, e.g., TAX FOUND., TAX DATA: U.S. FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RATES HISTORY 1913-2009, supra note 217; cf TAX. FOUND., TAX DATA: FEDERAL
CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES, INCOME YEARS 1909-2009, supra note 217 (providing
rates from 1909 to 2009, and providing a framework that suggests what the corporate rates
for 2010 might be).
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